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―In the practical use of our intellect, forgetting is as important as remembering.‖  
William James 
 
 Why is it that people tend to forget what they want to remember, and remember 
what they want to forget? It seems that in our daily lives, where we are constantly 
bombarded with information which we wish to remember, we tend to have difficulty 
holding on to some important material.  Most people have had the experience of getting 
up to go the kitchen only to forget what one wanted upon entering the kitchen.  Why is 
this so? 
 On the other hand, many of us have had the experience of wanting to let go of 
some thoughts and memories, which are painful and hurt us cognitively making it 
difficult to concentrate on daily tasks.  It seems that many of these memories are negative 
in nature.  Why is it so difficult to let go of and ignore these thoughts and memories, 




 This dissertation centers on these two themes, which have significant implications 
both for theoretical psychology and daily life and systems design.  In Chapter 2: ―In 
search of Decay in Verbal Short-term Memory‖ a series of experiments are conducted 
aimed to uncover the major cause of forgetting in short-term memory.  From a series of 
seven experiments, it was found that newly formed memories can overwrite past 
information, thus causing forgetting.  However, memories appear not to decay via the 
mere passage of time.  These studies showed the overwhelming contribution of 
interference (where new information can overwrite old information, but old information 
can also prevent the learning of new information) on forgetting in short-term memory.  
As the James quote suggests, this is not necessarily a bad thing.  Forgetting information is 
critical to effective cognitive performance.  Consider how debilitating life would be if we 
remembered minute daily details, it would be burdening.  In fact, recent research has 
shown that less hippocampal neurogenesis is related to better short-term memory (i.e., 
limited neural capacity may actually help to filter out useless information and prevent the 
system from being overwhelmed; Saxe et al., 2007).   Perhaps, then, interference plays 
the role of wiping out information so that we are not inundated with details.  This only 
becomes problematic when it interferes with memories that we actually want to keep.  
Chapter 2 has been published in Berman, M.G.,  Jonides, J., & Lewis, R.L. (2009).  ―In 
Search of Decay in Verbal Short-term Memory.‖ The Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 35(2):317-333. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation focus on applying basic research on 
interference and short-term memory to major depressive disorder (MDD) and rumination, 




Chapter 3 utilizes a directed-forgetting task that is similar in spirit to the recent-probes 
task that is used throughout Chapter 2.  In fact, Nee, Jonides & Berman (2007) showed 
that the two tasks activate overlapping neural networks suggesting similarities between 
the two tasks.  Chapter 3 explores whether people suffering from major depressive 
disorder have a selective deficit in removing negatively valenced information from short-
term memory; Is negative information in short-term memory more interfering for people 
suffering from depression than healthy controls (HC)?  Alternatively, people suffering 
from major depression may show a more general deficit in resolving interference, but 
Joormann et al., (2010) suggest that the deficit may be selective to negative valence.  
Chapter 3 also explores the neural mechanisms that may underlie these deficits in 
resolving interference from negatively valenced information and their relation to 
ruminative processes.  Chapter 3 is currently a manuscript that was reviewed for 
publication and is now being revised for resubmission. 
 While the focus of Chapter 3 was on a short-term memory task involving 
valenced stimuli, Chapter 4‘s focus is on off-task behavior and neural activity for MDDs 
and HCs.  One can conceptualize rumination as an internal form of interference.  One can 
imagine it being difficult to work and concentrate if many attentional resources are 
devoted to thinking and perseverating about past negative episodes (e.g. a break-up with 
a romantic partner).  What‘s interesting is that it appears that MDDs ruminate more 
strongly when they are not engaged in a task, and that being engaged in a task may 
disrupt neural networks that may mediate ruminative tendencies.  The results from 
Chapter 4 suggest that the study of depression should not only center on on-task 




engage in ruminative processes, which may be disrupted both neurally and behaviorally 
by engaging in a task.  It is of note that the word interference does not appear in Chapter 
4, and yet rumination does act as internal interference for these participants who suffer 
from depression; it is the background noise that hurts their ability to concentrate.  Chapter 
4 was reviewed for publication and is currently under revision for resubmission.    
 Understanding the underlying mechanisms of depression has important 
implications, especially when considering that nearly 20% of Americans will experience 
a major depressive episode during their lifetime (Andrade et al., 2003; Kessler et al., 
2003).  According to the World Health Organization (2001), depression is the 2
nd
 most 
damaging cause of Disability Adjusted Life Years, and greatly hurts economic 
productivity.  Therefore, understanding more about this disease will potentially have 
important impacts on society. 
 Chapter 5 summarizes this work, and also suggests some future directions to take 
this research.  In addition, Chapter 5 suggests some therapeutic interventions that may be 
useful to alleviate depressive symptoms including interacting with nature. 
    






Chapter 2  




Is forgetting in the short-term due to decay with the mere passage of time, interference 
from other memoranda, or both?  Past research on short-term memory (STM) has 
revealed some evidence for decay and a plethora of evidence showing that STM is 
worsened by interference.  However, none of these studies has directly contrasted decay 
and interference in STM in a task that rules out the use of rehearsal processes.  In this 
paper we present a series of studies using a novel paradigm to address this problem 
directly, by interrogating the operation of decay and interference in STM without 
rehearsal confounds.  The results of these studies indicate that short-term memories are 
subject to very small decay effects with the mere passage of time, but that interference 
plays a much larger role in their degradation.  We discuss the implications of these results 







 Why do we forget when the information to be remembered is modest in amount 
and the retention interval is short?  That is, what causes forgetting of information in 
short-term memory?  This is a question that has engaged psychology for over a century, 
and yet its answer remains elusive.  
 One theory that has a long history in accounting for forgetting is decay.  The 
claim of this theory is that as time passes, information in memory erodes and is therefore 
less available for later retrieval.  Decay has been a popular concept with respect to short-
term memory, especially with the emergence and influence of Baddeley‘s short-term 
memory architecture (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2000).  However, the concept 
of decay is not without problems.  For one, the concept doesn‘t make much sense without 
elaboration.  After all, the mere passage of time alone cannot cause forgetting.  For a 
decay theory to be of value, it must lay claim to some process or processes that occur 
more and more as time passes.   
 Finding the mechanism or process of decay is one problem, but finding empirical 
evidence for decay is an even greater problem. In principle, it seems relatively 
straightforward to conduct an experiment to examine whether decay is a cause of 
forgetting:  Provide a participant with some material to memorize, allow a varying short 
period of time during which the material must be maintained in memory, and then probe 
the participant to determine how much information was retained.  If decay is operating, 
then as the length of the retention interval increases, there should be worse retrieval of the 
retained information.  Although this experiment is in principle straightforward, in 





 Consider the classic study of Peterson and Peterson (1959), originally thought to 
provide strong evidence for decay.   In this experiment, participants were given a letter-
trigram to store, followed by a retention interval that varied from 3 to 18 sec.  During the 
retention interval, participants were required to count backwards by 3‘s to prevent 
rehearsal of the memorandum.  Following the retention interval, participants recalled the 
item in memory.  Peterson and Peterson (1959) found that performance declined as 
retention intervals increased, and the authors attributed this decline to increasing decay of 
the memory trace with increasing time.  The attribution of this effect to a decay 
mechanism is, however, suspect.   
 First, Peterson and Peterson argued that counting backwards could not be a source 
of interference because their secondary task materials differed sufficiently from the item 
to be stored in memory (letters vs. numbers). Yet, it is surely the case that the counting 
task requires short-term retention of material just as does the main memory task (e.g., you 
have to remember the number 743 to do a subtraction of 3 from it to yield the next 
number in the series).  So, retroactive interference (RI) is a likely contributor in this task.  
Also, others have shown that interference can be produced by other verbalizable items 
that are not similar to the to-be-remembered material (Wixted, 2005; Postle, D‘Esposito 
and Corkin, 2005), blunting Peterson and Peterson‘s interference argument.  Therefore, 
Peterson and Peterson‘s claim that the materials are sufficiently distinct to avoid 




 Second, Keppel and Underwood (1962) showed that on the very first trial of an 
experiment like that of Peterson and Peterson (1959), there is little or no forgetting as a 
function of retention interval even though there is such forgetting on later trials.  Keppel 
and Underwood (1962) interpreted this contrast between first and later trials as evidence 
that Proactive Interference (PI) plays a major role in the experiment and worsens memory 
performance.  These findings substantially question whether a decay mechanism needs to 
be trotted out to account for any forgetting in this sort of experiment (Nairne, 2002).  In 
short, proactive and retroactive interference accounts may provide a better explanation of 
the forgetting phenomenon that Peterson and Peterson (1959) attributed to decay.   
 Another important problem in assessing the role of decay on short-term memories 
for verbal material is the habitual tendency of people to rehearse material that they are to 
retain.  This is evident in the laboratory and in everyday life.  When we look up a phone 
number in the directory and then walk over to the phone, we rehearse the now-
memorized number until it is dialed.  This happens so habitually that it is often not 
noticed and is difficult to disengage.  The technique that investigators have used most 
often to prevent rehearsal (so that they could get an accurate gauge of whether decay was 
exerting an effect on memory) is to have subjects engage in a secondary task that 
prevents rehearsal.   
 The Petersons used counting backwards as their secondary task, but we have 
already seen that this task, in itself, requires short-term retention, and so it does more than 
just prevent rehearsal; it produces interference.   Others have tried different methods, 
such as tone detection, as a secondary task to prevent rehearsal.  The idea here is to find a 




short-term retention; and it must use items sufficiently dissimilar from the memoranda to 
render interference immaterial.  Although early evidence from such experiments 
suggested that under these conditions there was no forgetting of primary material, and 
hence no influence of decay (Reitman, 1971; Shiffrin, 1973), later research discovered 
that the early work may not have taxed processing capacity sufficiently (Reitman, 1974).  
 Indeed, a careful analysis of these studies by Roediger, Knight, and Kantowitz 
(1977) makes one wonder whether the use of a secondary task is appropriate to prevent 
rehearsal at all.  They compared conditions in which a retention interval was filled by 
nothing, by a relatively easy task, or by a relatively difficult one.  Both conditions with a 
filled interval led to worse memory performance, but the difficulty of the intervening task 
had no effect.  Roediger et al. (1977) concluded that the primary memory task and the 
interpolated task, although demanding, used different processing pools of resources, and 
hence the interpolated tasks may not have been effective in preventing rehearsal.  So, 
they argued, this sort of secondary-task technique may not prevent rehearsal and may not 
allow for a convincing test of a decay hypothesis.   
 Posner and Rossman (1965) explored the difficulty of interpolated tasks on 
memory performance and did find that the more difficult the interpolated task, the more 
forgetting ensued.  However, in their experiments the interpolated tasks operated on the 
actual memoranda.   More importantly, though, like Roediger et al. (1977), Posner and 
Rossman (1965) did find increases in memory errors even for simple interpolated tasks, 
suggesting that these tasks produce interference also.  These data indicate that secondary 




 Other potential evidence for decay comes from studies of serial recall accuracy, 
which is better for words that have shorter articulatory durations compared to longer 
durations (known as the word-length effect; Baddeley et al., 1975; Schweickert and 
Boruff, 1986; Mueller et al., 2003).  The word-length effect, however, is not without 
criticism.  In a review by Lewandowsky and Oberauer (2008), the authors explain that the 
word-length effect is inherently correlational, dependent on specific stimulus materials 
and subject to other non-verbal rehearsal strategies such as refreshing (Raye et al., 2007).  
In addition, the number of times that items are rehearsed in these studies is not controlled, 
so items with shorter articulatory durations may be rehearsed more often than those of 
longer durations, which may lead to stronger memory representations independent of 
decay. All of these lines of evidence eliminate the word-length effect as viable evidence 
supporting decay.     
More recently, research on serial recall has shown no evidence of time-based 
decay in verbal short-term memory.  Lewandowsky, Duncan, and Brown (2004) have 
shown that altering recall speeds (by either speeding or slowing recall) had no impact on 
serial recall performance.  This would not be predicted by decay models of short-term 
memory, which would hypothesize worse serial recall accuracy with slower recall speeds.  
The authors also eliminated rehearsal with articulatory suppression (e.g., having 
participants repeat a non-memory word aloud to eliminate the ability to rehearse 
memoranda) during the delays between stimulus presentations, which eliminates 
rehearsal confounds.  In addition, the authors modeled their data and found that adding a 
time-weighting parameter did not improve the fits, as output interference alone could 




 It appears, then, that standard behavioral paradigms have not provided compelling 
evidence for the role of decay in forgetting of intentionally stored verbal material.  Are 
there other approaches to the study of decay that may be more convincing? 
 One move is to examine the role of decay in the forgetting of nonverbal material, 
under the rationale that if the nonverbal material is not itself easily subject to a verbal 
code, participants will not be able to engage in rehearsal as a technique to maintain 
memory.  This is a slippery route to take.  First, there are many sorts of nonverbal 
materials that are themselves subject to verbal coding.  For example, research by Meudell 
(1977) used 4 x 4 matrices, four of whose cells were filled, with the filled cells being the 
memoranda in the experiment.  These sorts of stimuli seem quite susceptible to verbal 
coding.  This problem can be avoided, however, as indicated by Harris (1952) who used 
auditory pitches as memoranda that differed subtly in frequency, so subtly that an 
effective verbal code would have been difficult to create.  Harris (1952) varied the 
retention interval between a target tone and a probe tone from 0.1 to 25 sec. and found an 
orderly decline in performance in decisions about whether the tones matched with 
increasing retention intervals.  A study of this sort seems more convincing about the 
value of decay as a mechanism of forgetting, at least on the face of it.   
 Even this study, however, may be subject to the interpretation that during the 
otherwise quiet retention interval, participants were engaged in some sort of thinking that 
made use of short-term retention processes, and so exerted a retroactive interference 
effect on the experiment.  Cowan, Saults, and Nugent (1997) also showed evidence of 
decay in a tone-matching task, i.e., worse performance with increased time between 




Saults and Nugent (1997) varied two intervals, the time between tones to be judged (Inter 
Stimulus Interval - ISI) and the time between tone pairs (Inter Pair Interval – IPI).  The 
authors found that even when the ratio of IPI:ISI was controlled, increased forgetting 
ensued with increased ISI thus supporting decay (Cowan, Saults, and Nugent, 1997).  
However, when the authors re-analyzed these data and considered the IPI from the 
previous trial and the ISI from the previous trial, different conclusions were drawn.  For 
example, on trials where the previous trial‘s IPI and ISI were long (24 sec and 12sec) and 
the current IPI was long (24 sec), no forgetting ensued across the current trial‘s ISI, 
which varied from 1.5 – 12 seconds, thereby not supporting decay (Cowan, Saults, and 
Nugent, 2001).  These results can be interpreted in terms of tones from the current trial 
being more distinct from one another and from previous tones at these longer time scales 
(Cowan, Saults, and Nugent, 2001) thereby mitigating proactive interference from past 
tones.     
 Additionally, Brown, Neath and Chater (2007) simulated Cowan, Saults, and 
Nugent‘s (1997) original decay findings with their SIMPLE model, which is not 
dependent on time-based decay.  The intuition behind this model is the following.  When 
the ISI between the current pair of tones is longer, these tones are more susceptible to 
proactive interference from previous tones, even when the current IPI is increased to 
account for the longer current trial‘s ISI.  As such, the model successfully simulated the 
results from Cowan, Saults and Nugent, (1997) leading the author‘s to conclude that the 
apparent effect of decay with increasing ISI may in fact be due to increased Proactive 




 Another move to study decay is to encase the study of this mechanism in a task 
that does not overtly require memory, such as an incidental or implicit memory task.  
This is an important  point because even with the compelling evidence against decay by 
Lewandowsky et al. (2004), participants were still required to recall all presented stimuli 
and thus could have performed more covert forms of rehearsal, such as refreshing (Raye 
et al., 2007), that could mask potential decay effects.  In addition, articulatory 
suppression may not prevent such refreshing processes (Raye et al., 2007; Hudjetz and 
Oberauer, 2007).  Since the task required repeating back all presented items, such 
refreshing strategies would be advantageous and would lead to better serial recall.  More 
recently, however, Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2008) and Lewandowsky, Geiger, and 
Oberauer (2008) blocked refreshing with a choice reaction time task and found no 
forgetting in serial recall at long delays vs. short delays; again showing that memory does 
not decay with the mere passage of time.   
 In all of these studies which we have cited exploring decay, the participants are 
aware that they must remember stimulus items on which they will be tested at some later 
time.  While many researchers have been careful to prevent rehearsal and refreshing, 
which may have masked decay phenomena, it would be better if participants had no 
motivation to rehearse/refresh memoranda.  This requires moving to a paradigm that tests 
memory more implicitly, thereby removing the motivation to rehearse memoranda.  
McKone (1995, 1998) tested decay in such a paradigm that explored decay in implicit 
short-term memory by varying the time between successive repetitions of an item in a 
lexical decision task.  The issue was whether there was a savings in decision time, with 




about this experiment is that there was no overt memory task involved, so there was no 
reason for subjects to rehearse each item after a trial had been completed.  McKone 
(1998) found that when the amount of time between repeated items increased (the lag 
interval varied from 2 to 16 sec. in increments of 2 sec.
 1
) lexical decision time increased, 
suggesting the decay of these short-term memory representations.  McKone (1995, 1998) 
also varied the number of intervening items between repetitions which also increased 
lexical decision time of the repetitions, and interestingly, this interference effect was 
stronger than the decay effect.   
In our view, McKone‘s (1998) study provides good evidence for decay: the 
paradigm provides no encouragement for rehearsal, and decay and interference were 
independently manipulated.  Of course, one may argue that the technique used by 
McKone (1998) does not tap the role of decay in explicit short-term memory in that her 
measure of memory depended on the facilitation of a lexical decision.  Therefore, these 
results may be tangentially related to the exploration of decay in short-term memory, 
because it could be argued that McKone‘s stimuli never entered the explicit focus of 
attention (i.e., they were never maintained or retrieved) and rather were processed 
without an intentional memory component.   Nevertheless, this technique is an effective 
one for controlling for other issues, as we argue, and so it bears further exploration.  
 Taken together, the evidence supporting decay is equivocal.  Studies of explicit 
memory provide some substance to the notion that decay is a source of forgetting, but 
these results are often difficult to interpret for two reasons.  First, participants have a 
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habitual tendency to rehearse during unfilled intervals; and second, preventing rehearsal 
with a secondary task has the potential to interfere with memory performance in the 
primary task.  We now describe a new paradigm intended to avoid both problems. 
 
Exploring Decay and Interference in Explicit Short-Term Memory 
  
To contrast decay and interference as causes of forgetting in STM, we used a 
Recent-probes task that is a variant of the item-recognition task introduced by Sternberg 
(Sternberg, 1966; Monsell, 1978).  As we describe below, this task has the virtues of 
testing explicit short-term memory, avoiding any encouragement for rehearsal, and 
supporting precise and orthogonal manipulations of retention intervals and item-based 
interference.  
In this task the participant is shown 4 target words to remember for a brief 
retention interval of several seconds.  A probe word is then presented and the participant 
is instructed to respond affirmatively if the probe is one of the words in the stimulus set, 
or negatively if it is not.  The manipulation of interest has to do with pairs of trials in 
which the probe does not match any member of the current target set, but does match a 
member of the set shown on the previous trial. On these trials, participants are delayed in 
responding ‗No‘ to the probe compared to a novel probe that has not appeared recently.  
This delay in responding is due to the high familiarity of the recent probe, it having been 
presented on the previous trial. These two ―No‖ response trial-types (recent and non-




The extra time taken to negate a recently presented ―No‖ probe (RN trial) is typically 50-
100ms more than a non-recent ―No‖ probe (NRN trial).  This effect is highly reliable in 
both response time (RT) and accuracy (ACC), but is typically more robust in RT due to 
high accuracy overall in this paradigm. The effect has been replicated many times, and 
there are neuroimaging data localizing the brain mechanisms that are engaged by the 
interference produced by the recent probes task (Nee, Jonides and Berman, 2007; Jonides 
et al., 1998; Nelson et al., 2003; Mecklinger et al., 2003; D‘Esposito et al., 1999; Badre 
and Wagner, 2005; Jonides and Nee, 2006; Bunge et al., 2001).  In summary, the Recent-
probes task provides robust interference effects of previously seen items affecting 
recognition performance, both behaviorally and neurally.    
 The epoch of time in the Recent-probes task that interests us is the inter-trial 
interval (ITI).  We seek to examine whether variations in the length of this interval or in 
the insertion of other tasks during this interval has an effect on the size of the Recent-
probes effect.  This task is ideal for investigating causes of forgetting because once any 
trial has ended in this task, participants have little reason to rehearse items on that trial or 
any previous trials.  Therefore, this task avoids the problem of having rehearsal occur 











Figure 2-2: Non-Interference Trial from the Recent Probes Task 
 
Exploring Decay in STM 
 
The aim of these experiments was to document whether short-term memories 
show evidence of decay in the Recent-probes task.  We varied the ITI that separated 
adjacent trials; if memories decay with the mere passage of time, then RN probes taken 
from trials that had longer preceding ITIs should not be as interfering compared to RN 
probes that were taken from previous trials that had shorter ITIs.  Here we measure the 
effect of time from the end of the previous trials (i.e., from the previous trial‘s probe) 




13 seconds, the total time from the previous trial could be 7, 11, 15, and 19 seconds.  
These timelines are outlined in Table 1 for all of our experiments.   
 
Table 2-1: The delay time values for Experiments 1-5 and 7.  The delay times are 
broken down by different durations of the different components of a recent probes trial. 
 
Experiment 1: 
Methods:   
Twenty participants (18 females, mean age = 25.2) were recruited from the University of 
Michigan to participate in the study.  All participants gave informed consent as reviewed 
by the University‘s Institutional Review Board.  Participants were paid 10 dollars per 
hour for their participation plus bonuses for fast and accurate responding throughout the 




with following equation: TrialScore = Probe ACC * (700 - Probe RT); where probe 
accuracy is a binary variable, ‗1‘ if correct and ‗0‘ if incorrect.  Individual trial scores 
were summed together to yield a total score.  Participants were paid a penny for each 
point of their total score.   
 
Procedure:  We used the Recent-probes task to assess decay by varying the ITI between 
adjacent trials. There were four ITI values: 1 sec., 5 sec., 9 sec. and 13 sec.  On each trial 
the participant was shown four target words for 2 seconds.  Following a 3-second blank 
delay (retention interval), the participant was shown one of four possible probe-words 
(which defined the trial-types variable that we analyzed):  a non-recent positive (NRP) 
probe that was a member of the current stimulus set, but was not a member of the past 
stimulus set, a recent positive probe (RP) that was a member of the current set and the 
previous set, a non-recent negative (NRN) probe that was not a member of the current 
target set and was novel (i.e., never seen in the experiment), and a recent negative (RN) 
probe that was not a member of the current set, but was a member of the previous trial‘s 
set.  For each target set, two words overlapped with the previous set so that recency of 
appearance could not be used to predict the type of trial that would be encountered (a 
positive or negative trial).  There were 192 trials total, with 48 RN, 48 NRN, 48 RP, and 
48 NRP trials.  Of the 48 trials, 12 were from each of the different ITI values.  Trials 
were presented in random order, with an equal number of each trial-type were presented 





Materials: We used 440 words in this experiment.  Words ranged from 4-6 letters and 1-2 
syllables with a mean frequency of 118.96 per million (SD = 109.042). 
 
Design and Analysis:    In these studies we were interested in only three dependent 
measures: NRN response-time, RN response-time, and the effect of contrasting RN and 
NRN response time.  We report positive trial accuracy only to show that participants took 
the task seriously; positive trial performance was not important theoretically.   In 
addition, overall accuracy for this task is near ceiling, therefore accuracy data are not 
explored in great detail.  A repeated measures ANOVA 4(time intervals) x 1(trial-type) 
design was used in this experiment.  There were three dependent variables: NRN 
response time, RN response time, and the RN – NRN contrast.  Of most interest was 
whether the response time to RN trials and the RN - NRN contrast decreased with 
increasing time.  In the analysis of response time, only the means of correct trials were 
used.  Planned-comparison paired t-tests were later performed to test contrasts of interest 
as well as linear contrasts to test linear response time decreases as a function of 
increasing ITI.  
 
Results and Discussion:   
 In this experiment we found no evidence for decay in short-term memory.  Time 
did not reliably alter RN response time (F(3, 57) = .626, n.s.) the RN – NRN contrast 
(F(3, 57) = 2.469, p = .07) or NRN response time (F(3, 57) = 2.744, p = .051).  However, 




increases in NRN response time with increasing delay time.  As can be seen from Figure 
2-3, response time to RN trials does not decrease with increasing delay time and stays 
rather constant at 670 ms., a finding that does not support decay.    In addition, not one of 
the linear contrasts was reliable, which tested a linear decline in response time with 
increasing ITI (though there was a borderline reliable increase in NRN response time).  
Moreover, there were no effects on accuracy, and accuracy for all trial-types, including 
positive trials, was above 94%.  Lastly, with paired t-tests we found that the RN – NRN 
contrast was highly reliable at all time intervals.  In sum, Experiment 1 yielded little to no 
evidence for decay.  Had decay played a role, response time should have decreased with 
increasing time for RN trials and the RN – NRN contrast.  The results from Experiment 1 
can be seen in Figure 2-3 and in Tables 2-2 thru 2-4. 
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 There is one additional point to consider from Experiment 1.  In this experiment, 
there were occasions when an RN probe could have been seen repeatedly on many 
previous sets because the RN probe was chosen randomly from the previous set.  This 
repetition occurred on roughly 50% of the RN trials.    This repetitive stimulus 
presentation could have raised the familiarity of RN items, which may have prevented 
them from decaying as quickly with time if the traces had stronger activation from the 
beginning.  When we explored post-hoc (with a repeated measures ANOVA) those RN 
trials in which the probe was from the previous trial only we found that response time for 
RN trials (F(3, 57) =.827, n.s.), NRN trials (F(3, 57) = 1.721, n.s.) and the RN-NRN 
contrast (F(3, 57) = 1.578, n.s.) did not change with increasing time.  Accuracy also did 
not change with time for these trials as accuracy for RN trials (F(3, 57)=1.290, n.s.), 
NRN trials (F(3, 57) = 1.260, n.s.) and the RN-NRN contrast (F(3, 57) = 1.815, n.s.) did 
not change with increasing delay times.  Therefore, when we analyzed the trials of 
Experiment 1 with the lowest familiarity levels, we still found no evidence for decay with 
the mere passage of time.  Although this analysis yielded no evidence of decay for the 
purest trials in Experiment 1, we thought it wise to control this variable experimentally.  
























Experiment 2: Lower Proactive Interference 
 
 In Experiment 2 we ensured that all RN probes were presented only in the 
immediately previous set
3
 and were not members of many previous target-sets 
consecutively.  In addition, we ensured that RN probes were not probed items on the 
previous set.  We felt that this arrangement would reduce ambient proactive interference 
levels even lower than in Experiment 1.  We still maintained the same hypothesis as in 
the previous study that response time to RN trials would not vary with increasing time 
between trials.   
     
Methods:   
Twenty-Two participants (17 females; mean age = 20.3) were recruited from the 
University of Michigan to participate in the study.  One participant was excluded for 
having very low accuracy (below 50% on some trial-types).  Other than that change, this 
experiment was the same in all respects as that of Experiment 1.   
 
Results and Discussion:   
 Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1; there were no changes in 
response time and accuracy with increasing delay time, again suggesting that short-term 
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 On each trial of the experiment 2 words overlapped from the previous set, which meant that each RN 
probe was actually taken from the past set and the one before it.  Keeping this overlap prevented us from 





memories in this paradigm do not decay with the passage of time.  Delay time did not 
reliably alter RN response time (F(3, 60) = .911, n.s.), but the RN – NRN contrast did 
vary reliably with time (F(3, 60) = 3.048, p < .05).  However, this change in the contrast 
was due to idiosyncratic changes in NRN response time with changes in time (F(3, 60) = 
5.471, p <0.001).  When we explored this effect further, by separating participants 
according to working memory spans (as measured with operation-span
4
 Turner and 
Engle, 1989; Unsworth et al., 2005), we found that only the low-span participants showed 
these reliable changes in NRN response time and RN response time
5
, suggesting that they 
may not have been as vigilant and may have had more task-unrelated-thoughts 
throughout the study, especially during long ITIs (Kane et al., 2007).    
 In addition, not one of the linear contrasts was reliable, except for NRN response 
time.  This is important because the reliable changes did not produce any systematic 
effects with increased time; rather the changes were more idiosyncratic and would not be 
predicted by decay theories (that pattern was non-monotonic).  Moreover, there were no 
effects on accuracy; accuracy for all trial-types, including positive trials, was above 95%.  
Lastly, with paired t-tests we found that the RN – NRN contrast was highly reliable at all 
delay intervals.  In sum, Experiment 2 yielded little evidence for decay.  Had decay 
played a role, response time should have decreased monotonically with increasing delay 
time for RN response time and the RN – NRN contrast.  The changes in the RN – NRN 
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 In the operation span task that was used was the automated operation span task (Unsworth et al., 2005).  
Here subjects need to remember words while simultaneously solving math problems.   We defined high and 
low span participants by performing a median split on their operation span scores. 
 
5 Low span participants showed a reliable difference in RN response-time when comparing the 1 sec. ITI to 






contrast were due to idiosyncratic changes in NRN response time with increasing time.  
These reliable NRN response time changes with increasing delay time concerned us and 
motivated Experiments 3 and 4.  The results from Experiment 2 can be seen in Tables 2-
4. 
  
Experiments 3 and 4: Shorter ITIs 
 
 Experiments 1 and 2 showed that short-term memories do not decay reliably with 
the mere passage of time.  However, concerns arose regarding participants‘ vigilance at 
longer delays for NRN trials, which produced borderline reliable changes in the RN – 
NRN effect for Experiment 1 and reliable changes for Experiment 2.  In addition, 
viewing Table 1, these changes in the RN – NRN effect seemed to be driven by delay 
times between 7 and 11 seconds.  These concerns led us to quicken the pace of the 
experiment and focus on time delay values that were near 7 and 11 sec.  This achieves 
two goals.  First, a quicker pace to the experiment and shorter ITI values should eliminate 
any vigilance problems that may have arisen in Experiments 1 and 2.  Such vigilance 
problems may have been related to task unrelated thoughts that could have produced 
interference at longer time delays.  Second, exploring decay at shorter delay times 
allowed us to examine whether decay processes happen quite early in the delay interval 
and may have been largely completed by the time we began measurements at the shortest 








Methods:   
Twelve participants (7 females; mean age = 20.8) were recruited from the University of 
Michigan.  All subject procedures were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Procedure:  The procedure for this experiment was similar to that of Experiment 2 except 
for two changes.  First, the retention interval between the stimulus display and the probe 
word was shortened from 3 seconds to 1 sec.  This was done to reduce the total time that 
separated contiguous trials so that decay could be explored at shorter intervals.  Second, 
the ITIs that were used were shortened to 500 ms, 2000 ms, 3500ms, and 5000ms.  In 
addition, there was a 500 ms warning that alerted participants that the next trial was 
approaching.  Therefore, our total delay times in this experiment were 4, 5.5, 7 and 8.5 
seconds, which can be seen in Table 1.  Lastly, the probe in this experiment remained on 
the screen for 2000 ms independent of the participant‘s response time.  Other than these 
changes this experiment was the same in all respects to that of Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Results and Discussion: 
 Experiment 3 replicated the key findings of Experiments 1 and 2 (modulo the 




time with increasing delay, again strongly suggesting that short-term memories in this 
paradigm do not decay with the mere passage of time.   Delay time did not reliably alter 
RN response time (F(3, 33) = 1.605, n.s.) the RN – NRN contrast (F(3, 33) = 1.150, n.s.) 
or NRN response time (F(3, 33) = 0.844, n.s.).  In addition, none of the linear contrasts 
was reliable, and no effects were found on accuracy as accuracy for all trial-types was 
above 93%.   Lastly, with paired t-tests we found that the RN – NRN contrast was highly 
reliable at all ITI intervals.  Therefore, Experiment 3 replicated the findings of 
Experiments 1 and 2, but did so in two important ways.  First, by shortening the delay 
intervals, we removed potential vigilance effects.  Second, we verified an absence of 
decay around the shorter time delays of Experiments 1 and 2 (i.e., 7 and 11 seconds) by 




 In Experiment 4 we shortened the delay times even further than in Experiment 3 
to explore decay at even shorter intervals. It may have been that at longer delay intervals 
we missed opportunities to find decay, especially if decay in STM exists on a much 





Methods:   
Twelve participants (8 females; mean age = 21.4) were recruited from the University of 
Michigan to participate in the study.  All subject procedures were the same as in the 
previous experiments. 
 
Procedure:  The procedure for this experiment was similar to that of Experiment 3, the 
only difference being the shortening of the ITIs even further. In this study the ITIs that 
were used were 300 ms, 800 ms, 1300ms, and 1800ms, which translated into delay times 
of 3.3, 3.8, 4.3 and 4.8 seconds that can be seen in Table 1.  For this study there was no 
warning fixation cross indicating that the next trial was approaching as it was 
unnecessary with such short ITIs.  All other aspects of this Experiment were the same as 
the three previous experiments. 
 
Results and Discussion: 
 Experiment 4 replicated the findings of the previous three experiments as there 
were no changes in response time with increasing ITI as shown in Tables 2, 3 and 5.  
Delay time did not reliably alter RN response time (F(3, 33) = 1.124, n.s.) the RN – NRN 
contrast (F(3, 33) = 0.954, n.s.) or NRN response time (F(3, 33) = 0.316, n.s.).  In 
addition, none of the linear contrasts was reliable, and no effects were found on accuracy 
as accuracy for all trial-types was above 92%.  Lastly, with paired t-tests we found that 
the RN – NRN contrast was highly reliable at all delay time intervals.  Therefore, 




vigilance effects and by testing decay at much shorter time intervals, where decay may 
have had a better chance to exist.     
 
Table 2-4: ANOVA results on response-time for Experiments 1 – 3.  Univariate tests 
test the reliability of ITI as a predictor of response time for the different dependent 
variables.  Linear contrasts tests the linear contrast or monotonic decrease of response-
time 
  
Experiment 5: Preventing potential covert rehearsal 
 Experiments 1-4 were built around the rationale that the Recent-probes task is a 




rehearsal during the critical delay interval; there is no reason at all for subjects to rehearse 
past trial items.  Nonetheless, while there is no reason for participants to rehearse the 
items from the previous trial during the ITI, it could be that participants covertly rehearse 
these items anyway.  If this were the case, of course, our paradigm would not be the ideal 
platform to test decay as a theory of forgetting that we have billed it to be.  To address 
this issue, in Experiment 5 we had participants perform articulatory suppression during 
the ITI to prevent covert rehearsal.  If participants were covertly rehearsing during the 
ITI, then those who engaged in articulatory suppression should be more susceptible to 
decay in STM than those who did not have articulatory suppression during the ITI. 
Methods:   
Twenty participants (12 females; mean age = 21.65) were recruited from the University 
of Michigan to participate in the study.  Two participants were removed: one for having 
inadvertently been a participant previously and another for having extremely low 
accuracy scores (33% on some trial-types).  All subject procedures were the same as in 
the previous experiments. 
 
Procedure:  The procedure for this experiment was similar to that of Experiment 1 as the 
same ITIs were used.  However, half of the participants were randomly chosen to be in 
the articulatory suppression condition, where participants had to count aloud ―1, 2, 3‖ 
repeatedly during the ITI.  The other participants performed the task in its original form.  
Experimenters were within earshot to ensure that the participants were performing the 





Design and Analysis:  Our design and analysis were similar to Experiments 1-4 except 
that we added a between-subject variable for whether the participant engaged in 
articulatory suppression or not. 
  
Results and Discussion: 
 Experiment 5 replicated the findings of the previous four experiments as there 
were no changes in response time and accuracy with increasing delay time.  This was true 
both for participants who replicated the procedure of Experiment 1 and for those who 
engaged in articulatory suppression.  In short, the addition of articulatory suppression had 
no effect in revealing evidence for the operation of decay.   
 In Tables 2, 3 and 5 one can see that delay time played no role in altering 
response time for any of the dependent variables for the both the articulatory suppression 
and non-articulatory suppression conditions.  Of most interest was whether articulatory 
suppression interacted with delay time.  We found that it did not, as RN response time did 
not change with increasing delay time depending on the articulatory suppression 
condition (F(3,48) = 0.400, n.s.), nor did the RN – NRN contrast (F(3,48) = 0.161, n.s.) 
or NRN response time (F(3,48) = 0.295, n.s.).  As expected, articulatory suppression did 
slow participants overall, because articulatory suppression may hinder participants from 
being as prepared to encode upcoming stimulus sets and because having to engage in 
articulatory suppression essentially makes this a task-switching paradigm.  Additionally, 




Experiment 5 replicated the findings of Experiments 1-4 even when any possible covert 
rehearsal of the previous trial‘s items was mitigated by articulatory suppression.  
 
Experiment 6:  Testing the Effects of Executive/Conscious Control 
 With Experiments 1 – 5 we have shown no evidence of short-term memory 
degradation with the mere passage of time.  With Experiment 5 we showed that 
participants were not rehearsing previous items during the ITI, because articulatory 
suppression during the ITI had no influence.  However, there have been recent proposals 
for refreshing processes that are not based on articulatory rehearsal, and these could 
potentially be used to re-activate past items (Raye, et al., 2007).   Such refreshing may 
allow participants to strategically tag past items with a context code (i.e., this word is on 
stimulus set ‗n-1‘ that was just seen), and therefore re-activating them could potentially 
help participants determine the correct negative response to recent negative foils (i.e., 
thereby counteracting familiarity of the recently seen items).   Experiment 6 was aimed at 
manipulating such conscious strategies by instructing participants to ignore past lists once 
a trial had ended.  If participants have some executive control over this effect, we would 
expect to see a change in the RN – NRN effect for participants who were instructed to 
ignore past sets versus those who were not. As stated above, such instructions could 
mitigate the RN – NRN effect if participants are able to tag past items as being foils.  
However, such instructions could also increase the RN – NRN effect if these instructions 
make past items more salient or familiar, and therefore more interfering.  In addition, the 
instructions may change the effect variably from subject to subject, which would be 





Methods:   
Forty participants (24 females; mean age = 21) were recruited from the University of 
Michigan to participate in the study.   
 
Procedure:  The procedure for this experiment was similar to that of Experiment 1, but 
only the 5000 ms ITI was used.  However, half of the participants were in the instruction 
condition, in which participants were warned to ignore previous sets.  The other 
participants performed the task with its original instructions
6
.   
 
Materials:  A subset of 30 words from Experiment 1 was used in this experiment. 
 
Design and Analysis:  A between-subjects ANOVA was conducted comparing RN, NRN 
and RN – NRN response times for subjects who were and were not instructed to ignore 
previous stimulus sets. 
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 The subjects that ran on the instruction version only had ITIs of 5000 ms.  Those that ran on the no 
instruction condition had all 4 ITI conditions, but only the 5000 ms ITI was analyzed.  Accuracies for all 
other trialtypes was above 95% and the mean correct RT values for the ITI values of 1, 5, 9 and 13 seconds 
for NRN trials were: 579, 586, 585, 576 and for RN trials were: 638, 643, 655, and 646.  There were no 





Results and Discussion: 
 
 We found that instructing participants to ignore past sets had no impact on RN 
response time (F(1,38) = 0.158, n.s.), NRN response time (F(1,38) = 0.062, n.s.) or the 
RN – NRN contrast (F(1,38) = 0.032, n.s.) as corroborated with a between-subjects 
ANOVA (see Figure 2-4).  These data indicate that participants may not be able to 
consciously remove past sets from mind to mitigate the interference that past items 
produce on current trials.  For example, one may hypothesize that participants could tag 
past sets as being from an episodic context different from the current set, which could 
dampen the interfering ability of past items.   However, our data suggest that the Recent-
probes effect is not subject to executive control, making it unlikely that some of the 
participants in earlier experiments were engaged in strategic refreshing.  Additionally, 
instructing participants to ignore past sets did not increase the RN – NRN effect (by 
potentially making RN items more salient), nor did it increase the variance of the effect 






Figure 2-4: Mean correct response-time results for Experiment 6 where we either 




Experiment 7: Direct Comparison of Decay and Interference 
 
 What we have in our first five experiments are null results, replicated over and 
over.  It is these null results that have caused us to argue that decay plays little role in 
accounting for forgetting of the familiarity of information that underlies the Recent-
probes effect.  With that said, there were some unreliable trends that may have implicated 
some time-based decay.  Of course, null results have to be taken with caution, but we 
have been cautious in various ways.  We explored decay over various time intervals; we 




mitigated by instructing participants to ignore past sets.  Even with this cautious attitude, 
we are left with a consistent finding:  Variations in the delay interval in our task left the 
magnitude of the interference effect undiminished.  This leads us to conclude that time-
based decay has little effect on this short-term memory task.   
With this in mind, we turned to interference as the key account of forgetting in 
this paradigm.  To compare the effect of interference with the effect of the passage of 
time, we constructed an experiment that pitted interference against decay in short-term 
memory.  Again, the Recent-probes task was used, with one major variation:  There were 
3 types of RN trials.  One-third of the RN trials had probes that were taken from the 2-
back set, and therefore had one intervening trial that separated the 2-back set from the 
current set.  Another third of the RN trials were taken from the 1-back set, but had an ITI 
that was equated to the length of a single trial (10 sec).  These two RN trials are shown in 
Figure 2-5.  Finally, one-third of the RN trials had an ITI of 1 sec. (i.e., the canonical RN 
trial).  With these RN trial-types we could directly compare interference versus decay by 
comparing response time and accuracy to the various RN trial-types.  To test the effects 
of interference we could compare RN 2-back trials vs. RN 1-back trials with an ITI of 10 
sec. To test the effects of time-based decay we could compare response time and 
accuracy of RN 1-back trials with an ITI of 10 sec vs. RN 1-back with an ITI of 1 sec.  
We predicted that 2-back RN trials would have faster response times compared to the 
other RN trials based on the idea that interference plays a stronger role in accounting for 
forgetting in this paradigm compared to decay
7
.    
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 Of course, some of our previous experiments can be analyzed this way as well.  Indeed, we analyzed 





Figure 2-5: A schematic of two RN trials from Experiment 7.  Notice that the ITI 
separating the two trials on the left can be a blank 10 sec. ITI or can be filled with another 
trial that lasts for 10 seconds.  In that case, the word ‗Golf‘ would be taken from the 2 
 
Methods: 
Twelve (7 females; mean age = 21.5) participants were recruited from the University of 
Michigan.  All subject procedures were the same as in the previous experiments. 
                                                                                                                                                 
at the impact of the number of intervening trials that separated the source trial that the negative probe-word 
was taken from.  We found a decreasing linear relationship between response time and the number of 





Procedure:  In this study there were 7 different trial-types: 2 types of positive trials
8
 (one 
with an ITI of 1 sec and one with an ITI of 10 sec) and 2 types of non-recent negative 
trials (one with an ITI of 1 sec and one with an ITI of 10 sec) and 3 different types of 
recent-negative trials (one with an ITI of 1 sec, one with an ITI of 10 sec, and one where 
the probe-word was taken from the 2-back set with each of the two previous trials having 
an ITI of 1 sec).  Therefore the total delay times from the past set were 7 seconds in the 
case of the 1 second ITI and 16 seconds in the case of the 10 second ITI.  Half of the 
trials were negative and half of the trials were positive; there were 192 trials in total (48 
of each positive trial-type, 24 of each RN trial-type, and 10 of each NRN trial-type).  One 
additional change we made for this task was that stimulus sets had no overlapping words, 
so that each set was composed of a new set of words that had not been seen for at least 
three trials.  This was done to eliminate recent positive trials to reduce the length of the 
experiment overall.  The retention interval in this study was 3 seconds as it was for 
Experiments 1, 2, 5 and 6. 
   
Design and Analysis:  A repeated measures ANOVA with one predictor, interval type, 
was used in this design.  The three intervals were a blank 1 sec interval, a filled interval 
with an intervening trial, and a blank 10 sec interval.  In addition, there were 2 measures 
of interest, RN response time and the RN – NRN contrasts.  In the response-time analysis 
only the means of correct trials were used.  With this design we could explore how the 
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different intervals affected these 2 measures.   Planned comparison t-tests were also 
performed on comparisons of interest.   
 
Results and Discussion: 
 We found that interference played a large role in forgetting in short-term memory, 
and we found no evidence for decay, which replicated our previous findings.  RN probes 
taken from 2-back stimulus sets were easier to reject than those taken from the 1-back set.  
In addition, longer delay times did not significantly alter performance, which confirmed 
that the mere passage of time does not cause forgetting in STM.   The results from 
Experiment 7 are shown in Figure 2-6.   
 With our repeated measures ANOVA we found that interval-type was a 
significant predictor of RN response time (F(2, 22) = 6.725, p < .01) and the RN – NRN 
contrast (F(2, 22) = 4.450, p < .05).  These reliable effects were driven by the 2-back 
condition, as RN probes taken from the 2-back stimulus set were easier to reject.   
 With planned paired t-tests, RN 2-back trials had significantly lower response 
times than 1-back RN probes at ITIs of 1 sec (mean diff = 61.21 ms, t(11) = 5.15, p<.001) 
and had significantly lower RT than 1-back RN probes at ITIs of 10 sec (mean diff = 
70.51 ms, t(11) = 2.97, p<.02).  However, there were no significant differences between 
1-back RN probes at ITIs of 1 sec and 1-back RN probes at ITIs of 10 sec (mean diff = 
9.3 ms, t(11) = 0.37, n.s.) showing that short-term memories do not decay with the 
passage of time.  In addition, the RN – NRN difference was reliably smaller when RN 




ITI (2-back vs. blank 1 sec. interval, mean diff = 82 ms, t(11) = 6.18, p < .001; 2-back vs. 
blank 10 sec. interval, mean diff = 70.51 ms, t(11) = 2.97, p<.02
9
).  However no 
differences were found between RN – NRN for long and short ITI‘s (mean diff = -11 ms, 
t(11) = .46, n.s.).  These data provide strong evidence showing that forgetting in STM is 
due more to interference than to decay with time.  There were no effects on accuracy as 
participants‘ accuracy for each trial-type was approximately 98%.    
   
 
Figure 2-6: Results from Recent Probes task pitting decay against interference.  Here 
we show the results from all of the negative trialtypes.  The _1000 or _10000 suffix 
designates a blank ITI of that length in msec.  The 2-back designation indicates that the 
probe word was taken from the 2-back set. 
 
                                                 
9 Same values as comparing the RN conditions, because the same NRN baseline was used from the blank 






 After completing these 7 experiments we thought it appropriate to aggregate the 
data from these studies together to explore decay further.  We averaged the RN – NRN 
effects across the various time intervals from our experiment and calculated delay time as 
the time from the previous trial‘s probe word.  Our time range was from 3.3 seconds to 
19 seconds.  We then regressed the RN – NRN effect against time, to see if time was a 
reliable predictor of the RN – NRN effect.  In addition to this regression, we compared 
these aggregated data to those of Experiment 7 to compare the effect of decay to the 
effect of interference for RN trials and the RN – NRN contrast. 
 From this regression analysis we found a slight trend of decay with time, with the 
RN – NRN contrast decreasing by 1.225 ms per second of additional delay time.  This 
regression was borderline reliable (F(1,24) = 3.288, p = .082).  We then normalized the 
RN – NRN difference by dividing this effect by RN + NRN to remove some potential 
scaling effects from the different studies (i.e., Studies 3 and 4 had overall faster RT, and 
the articulatory suppression participants in Study 5 were slower overall). With this new 
regression we found that the time variable was more reliable in predicting the normalized 
effect (F(1,24) = 9.127, p = .006), where the beta for the regression was -0.001356 
normalized effect units/sec.  Doing a conversion utilizing the average RN + NRN effect 
of 1337ms, this slope converts to a decrease of 1.814 ms in the RN – NRN contrast with 
every additional second of delay time.  Therefore we suspect that there is, in fact, a small 
but reliable decay effect when we aggregate our data across experiments.  These results 




 There are a few important points to make.  First, what are we to make of the small 
decay effect that emerges after aggregating across experiments?  Exploring our decay 
function in Figure 2-7, we see an initial increase in the RN – NRN effect with increasing 
time delay, followed by a drop in the effect with a long plateau.  It seems that existing 
decay theories would have difficulty modeling these data with their existing smooth 
exponential functions.  To make matters worse, what if there was steep decay from 0 
seconds of delay to 3.3 seconds (intervals we could not test in our paradigm)?  This 
would suggest a kind of step function, also inconsistent with current decay models.  
Second, in our experiments that explored decay at shorter time scales (Experiments 3 and 
4), we found no evidence for decay with time, and in fact found a slight, but unreliable, 
increase.  This suggests to us that at longer delays, participants might be engaged in some 
mental activity, such as mind-wandering, that would actually produce interference during 
these longer delays.  Lastly, it is important to compare these effects of time with the 
known effects of interference. Figure 2-7 graphically shows the effect of time-based 
decay (the shallow sloped line) together with the effect of interference (the steep line).  It 
is clear that the effect of interference swamps the small effect of decay.  Based on the 
estimates from our simple regression analysis, it would take a delay of 78 seconds for 
time-based decay to reduce the RN – NRN effect to zero.  For interference, this only 
required taking an RN probe from the 2-back trial.  In sum, there appears to be a small, 
but reliable effect of time in our data.  However, this effect may not be easily predicted 
by existing decay theories (a topic to which we return in more detail below), it is 
confounded with potentially increasing mental activity at longer delays, and most 






 In this chapter we explored an important and prominent topic in short-term 
memory research:  Does forgetting in short-term memory occur due to decay with time, 
interference from other material, or both?  With 6 experiments we have shown that decay 
with time does not produce much if any forgetting in short-term memory (modulo the 
small effect found from the aggregate analysis), and that interference plays a much more 
prominent role.  Recent research has also corroborated this finding (Lewandowsky, 
Duncan and Brown, 2004; Oberauer and Lewandowsky, 2008; Lewandowsky and 
Oberauer, 2008; Lewandowsky, Geiger, and Oberauer, 2008; Nairne, 2002).  However, 
an advantage of our experimental task over past research is that we have taken a different 
approach to tackling the rehearsal problem, not by preventing it, but by rendering it 
counterproductive to participants' intentions.  Therefore, we feel that our paradigm and 
results add important evidence to the growing consensus that time-based decay plays 
little role in causing forgetting in short-term memory. 
There are still some remaining questions that need to be addressed.  One concerns 
the sensitivity of the present experiments:  Perhaps we did not find decay in the 
individual experiments because they lacked sufficient power.   It is always possible, in 
principle, to construct a specific decay function with a quantitative form that is not 
detectable by any given experiment, so ruling out the entire class of decay theories is not 
possible (as evidenced by the small but reliable effect of time that was shown with our 
aggregated data).   But we can also inquire about the ability of our data set to detect 




evidence against existing theoretical proposals for decay.  We briefly consider these 
questions next, followed by a sketch of a candidate theory that we believe provides a 
promising account of the mechanisms underlying the phenomena surrounding the recent 
probes task.  
 
Effect size and power relative to other empirical findings 
 One way to calculate an expected decay effect-size is to use the effect-size of 
McKone (1998).  From 3-second to 7-second delays, McKone (1998) found roughly a 35 
ms reduction in repetition priming, which can be used as an assay of decay.  Our ability 
to detect such a reduction in the RN - NRN response time given our sample size and our 
observed variance is .52 and we found no such effect (our power here is smaller as we 
only had 12 subjects at the 3.3 second interval and needed to perform a between subjects 
analysis as the same subjects were not tested at the 3.3 second interval and the 7 second 
interval).  In fact, from Figure 2-7, one can see an opposite trend from 3.3 to 7 seconds.  
In order to detect our small, but reliable effect of decay, we needed to aggregate 96 
subjects worth of data.  Additionally, such small decay effects are not clearly predicted 
by existing decay theories.  In sum, we do not believe that our inability to find decay is 






Figure 2-7: Aggregated data from all Experiments.  The dashed blue line with 
asterisks represents the aggregated data based on delay time across all of our studies.  The 
green line is the linear fit of the effect of delay time on the RN – NRN contrast.  The red 
das dashed line with x‘s represents the effect of interference (i.e., taking the two back 
probe as the RN probe on the current trial).  From the figure one can see the stronger 
effect of interference compared to time-based decay. 
 
 
  We must also consider whether we are exploring decay at the proper time scale.  
In our paradigm, the shortest time-scale with which we explored decay was that in 
Experiment 4.  If we measure decay from the time when the probe from the last set was 
presented, when those items were reactivated by retrieval (and were last rehearsed), we 




while we did not
10
.  Therefore, we believe that we explored decay at sensible time 
intervals, ones that previous research had shown to be within the operating window of a 
decay mechanism.  Lastly, if there is decay at very short intervals (less than 3.3 seconds), 
decay theories would need to be adjusted and may reflect more of a step function, of 
steep decay at short intervals followed by a paucity of decay at longer intervals.  In 
summary, while our paradigm cannot examine decay at very short time-scales, our timing 
parameters are still sufficient to question what an overall decay function would look like 
(i.e., it may not be a smooth exponential). 
 
Consistency with existing models of decay 
 A number of prominent existing models of memory include well-specified decay 
components that might be inconsistent with the data presented here.  These include the  
Page and Norris (1998) Primacy Model, and its associated exponential decay equation.  
An examination of the form of this equation and the specific parameter values reported in 
Page and Norris (1998) suggests that it should predict a decline in response time with 
increasing delay times, assuming that the interference of a distractor is a function of its 
activation strength.  But as we discuss now, the application of such theories may not be 
this straightforward. 
Another prominent decay theory is the base-level activation equation of the ACT-
R architecture (Anderson, 2007; Anderson et al., 2004), which posits that the activation 
levels of items in declarative memory follows a nonlinear, negatively accelerated form. 
                                                 





This equation (with its associated fixed decay parameter of 0.5) is considered one of the 
most robust and successful components of ACT-R (Anderson, 2007).  ACT-R‘s memory 
theory has a further advantage of being integrated with a more general theory of cognitive 
and motor control.  We now consider briefly what is required to test that theory given our 
data set, not only because ACT-R is a prominent decay theory, but also because such 
consideration yields lessons for testing any decay theory. 
It is tempting for present purposes to simply plug in appropriate time values into 
the decay and retrieval latency equations, and generate estimates of the effects of decay.  
But this approach skips a fundamental step in applying an architectural theory:  
specifying the task strategy.   Effects of the basic architectural mechanisms are expressed 
through strategies that organize the mechanisms in service of task goals.  These strategies 
can modulate—and sometimes even obscure—the effects of the underlying mechanisms, 
both quantitatively and qualitatively (the problem of strategic variation is a difficult one; 
e.g., see Newell, 1990 and Meyer & Kieras, 1997).  In fact, in our initial attempts to 
develop detailed ACT-R models of the probe task using an existing published strategy 
(Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), we observed a surprising degree of this modulation.  In 
general, directly testing the fixed memory mechanisms is a significant theoretical 
challenge—even in simple tasks.  What is required is a combination of bringing the 
theory against multiple kinds of data sets (as advocated most persuasively by Newell, 
1990), and adopting both modeling and empirical approaches (such as our rehearsal 
manipulations) that greatly constrain the choice of strategy as a theoretical degree of 
freedom (e.g., Howes, Lewis & Vera, submitted).  We note that such methodological 




as ACT-R.   Any theory of some aspect of the fixed cognitive system—such as the nature 
of memory decay—faces these challenges, because any given posited fixed cognitive 
mechanism expresses itself only through selected task strategies. 
Given these considerations, a more circumspect view of our results suggests that 
they represent a new set of quantitative regularities that should provide important 
constraints on any detailed theory of memory that makes precise assertions about decay 
mechanisms—but that this empirical constraint will be felt most sharply when joined 
with the broad set of other growing results, from other tasks, also showing flat effects of 
time (Lewandowsky, Duncan and Brown, 2004; Oberauer and Lewandowsky, 2008; 
Lewandowsky and Oberauer, 2008; Lewandowsky, Geiger, and Oberauer, 2008; Nairne, 
2002).  There is a major opportunity to use computational modeling to test extant theories 
of decay and interference, but we think such an exercise would be most profitable if it 
takes into account a wide range of empirical effects and uses modeling techniques that 
help control for effects of strategic variation. 
 With these caveats in mind, our results do seem to more straightforwardly align 
with more recent models of short-term memory that do not implicate decay, including 
models such as SIMPLE (Brown, Neath, and Chater, 2007), and SOB (Farrell and 
Lewandowsky, 2002).  In SIMPLE, attention can (optionally) be directed away from time 
whereas SOB is necessarily completely free of any effect of time, and depends only on 
interference mechanisms.  We now sketch our own approach to understanding the recent 
probes task that is consistent with such models that explain forgetting in terms of 





Possible Mechanisms of the Recent Probes Task 
It is important to consider the mechanisms involved in the recent probes task and 
compare those mechanisms to processes involved in other tasks that found decay, such as 
McKone (1998).  First let‘s consider different neural mechanisms that are involved in 
repetition priming compared to explicit item recognition (Berry, Henson and Shanks, 
2006).  Many authors have reported double dissociations both neurally and behaviorally 
between priming and recognition memory (Hamann and Squire, 1997a, 1997b; Gabrieli 
et al., 1995; Keane et al., 1995) with priming being dependent on the occipital lobe, 
suggesting a strong perceptual component (Fiebach, Gruber, and Supp, 2005).  In contrast 
our task robustly activates the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
11
 for the RN – NRN 
contrast (Nee, Jonides and Berman, 2007; Jonides et al., 1998; Nelson et al., 2003; 
Mecklinger et al., 2003; D‘Esposito et al., 1999; Badre and Wagner, 2005; Bunge et al., 
2001).  In addition, McKone and Dennis (2000) found that phonological representations 
were less susceptible to time-based decay compared to orthographic representations in a 
similar repetition priming study.  In sum, differences in task demands, underlying neural 
processes, and the nature of the encoding of the stimuli could explain why decay was 
found in the repetition priming task, but not in our Recent-probes task.     
                                                 
 
11 Nee, Jonides and Berman, 2007 report activation in Occipital cortex for the RN – NRN contrast, but the 
other 6 neuroimaging studies of our task that we cite do not report occipital cortex activation.  In addition, 
we find increased activation in occipital cortex for the RN – NRN contrast, which is the reverse finding 
from repetition priming studies that find decreased activation for repeated items compared to non-repeated 
items.  Therefore we do not believe that this task recruits the same visual perceptual processing that is 






 We must also consider what the Recent-probes task has allowed us to measure.  
Beyond the manipulation of inter-trial interval which allowed us to assess the effects of 
delay, we were also able to further investigate whether participants rehearse past items 
during the blank ITIs in this paradigm.  As Experiments 5 and 6 showed, articulatory 
suppression did not modulate the effect, nor did instructing participants to ignore past 
sets.  Therefore, we argue not only that there is no incentive for subjects to rehearse in the 
task; whether they had any incentive to rehearse, they did not. 
 To understand a bit better what causes the recent-probes effect that is at the heart 
of the paradigm we have used, we turn to a theoretical interpretation of the effect 
provided by Jonides and Nee (2006).  In their review, the author‘s subscribe to the 
Biased-Competition model (Kan and Thompson-Schill, 2004; Desimone and Duncan, 
1995) as a theoretical model to explain the Recent-probes effect.  According to this 
model, when a RN probe is shown it activates attributes/features that are associated with 
the RN probe-word, such as its familiarity (which is high), context (seen on the previous 
trial), semantic representation, etc.  The important features here are familiarity and item 
context.  The high familiarity of the item will bias one to respond affirmatively when, in 
fact, the correct response is negative.  At the same time the context of the RN probe does 
not match that of the current item‘s context, and this contextual mismatch will bias one to 
respond negatively, which is the correct response.  Therefore, there are competing 
tendencies for RN items, and these competing tendencies slow participants compared to 
NRN items that have very low item familiarity, due to greater retroactive interference 




will yield faster responses than non-recent positive probes (a facilitation effect), which is 
sometimes found in this paradigm. 
 In order for a decay theory to accommodate these data, it would need to 
hypothesize that the two opponent features (i.e., item-familiarity and item-context) decay 
at the same rate, thus hiding any effects of decay as these two attributes seem to 
counteract each other.  Here we appeal to Occam‘s razor.  An interference account need 
not rely on two opponent processes balancing each other out to explain our data; rather, 
an interference account can explain our data with one feature, namely the presence or 
absence of interference.  Therefore we subscribe to an interference account based on its 
simplicity.  In addition, the likelihood that two opponent processes would balance each 
other perfectly seems small; especially when considering the research done showing the 
dissociation between processes reliant on item-context vs. item-familiarity (Jacoby, 1991) 
and their different time-courses (Yonelinas and Jacoby, 1994).   
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, although null results such as these cannot completely rule out the 
possibility of some effect of decay, the consistent pattern of results across these six 
experiments coupled with the extremely small effects observed, provide strong evidence 
against decay as a mechanism for forgetting in STM.  We argue that the small effect of 
time detected in the aggregate analysis might be a result of interference playing a role at 
longer time delays, with participants performing some mental activity (e.g. mind 




paradigm with respect to the best existing empirical evidence for decay suggest that our 
experiments did have sufficient power to detect canonical decay effects at reasonable 
delay intervals where decay had been shown to exist (McKone, 1998).  Our data show a 
persistence of short-term memory that may question the shape of existing decay 
functions, especially if there is rapid decay as shorter time delays.    Finally, we found 
clear evidence for a major role of interference as a mechanism of forgetting, which 
overshadowed any effect of decay in our paradigm.  
In the next chapter, interference in memory is explored in the context of Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) to determine whether MDD can be characterized by an 
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Chapter 3  




Individuals diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) often ruminate 
about their depression and their life situations, impairing their concentration and 
performance on daily tasks. We examined whether rumination might be due to a deficit in 
the ability to expel negative information from short-term memory (STM); also, we 
examined the neural structures involved in this ability using fMRI. We tested MDD and 
healthy control (HC) participants using a directed-forgetting procedure in an item-
recognition task.  As predicted, MDD participants had more difficulty than did HCs in 
expelling negative, but not positive, words from STM. Overall, the neural networks 
involved in directed-forgetting were quite similar for both groups; but the MDDs 
exhibited more spatial variability in activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus (a region 
critical for inhibiting irrelevant information) which may mediate their relative inability to 





In the previous chapter it was shown that interference is a major cause of 
forgetting in short-term memory.  In this chapter the role of interference is explored in 
relation to Major Depressive Disorder (MDD).  MDD has been characterized by high 
levels of rumination -- uncontrollable negative thoughts about the depressed individual‘s 
symptoms and situation that interfere with his or her ability to concentrate and effectively 
carry out daily activities (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Rumination is not merely a symptom 
of depression; it maintains and exacerbates depressive symptoms, and it predicts the 
likelihood of recurrence of depressive episodes (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Therefore, identifying the cognitive and 
neural mechanisms of rumination may help us to gain a better understanding of the 
etiology and maintenance of depression. 
Cognitive processes underlying rumination  
It is likely that rumination involves difficulties in controlling the contents of 
short-term memory (STM; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Joormann et al., 2010); thus, we 
propose that depressed individuals have a specific deficit in removing negative self-
relevant information from STM. The hypothesis is that this failure to expel negative 
information from STM leads to increased interference, which, in turn, results in 
difficulties in concentration and memory that have been associated with rumination and 
depression (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003).  
Considerable research has examined neural and cognitive mechanisms involved in 
resolving interference in STM (Berman, Jonides, & Lewis, 2009; D‘Esposito et al., 1999; 




McElree, 2007; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997).  Although some investigators have 
demonstrated that depression is associated with an impaired ability to remove negative 
information from STM once it enters (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Joormann et al., 2010; 
Whitmer & Banich, 2007), little research has examined the neural underpinnings of the 
relationship between depression and the ability to control information in STM. In this 
study, therefore, a STM interference task was employed to elucidate both neural and 
behavioral mechanisms that may underlie rumination and depression.  
Overview of Present Research 
A directed-forgetting task was used to assess interference resolution of affectively 
valenced stimuli in STM (Nee et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2003). The task required 
participants to attempt to forget previously encoded positive and negative words (see also 
Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Joormann et al., 2010). We hypothesized that MDD and HC 
participants would differ with respect to both behavioral and neural functioning when 
trying to forget negative, but not when trying to forget positive information. 
Behaviorally, we hypothesized that MDD participants would exhibit longer reaction 
times and poorer accuracy than would HCs when trying to forget negative words. We 
also hypothesized that higher levels of rumination would be associated with greater 
difficulty in forgetting negative items.   
Neurally, we expected to find differences between the two groups when forgetting 
negative items vs. positive items, specifically in the left inferior frontal gyrus (LiFG), a 
region that has been implicated in memory selection and inference resolution (D‘Esposito 
et al., 1999; Jonides et al., 1998; Nee, Jonides, & Berman, 2007; Nelson et al., 2003). We 




there could be differences in the magnitude of activation in LiFG between the two groups 
(e.g., MDDs may activate LiFG to a lesser degree than HCs) 2) there could be differences 
in the temporal variance of activations in LiFG (e.g., MDDs may activate LiFG more 
variably over time than HCs) and 3) there could be differences in spatial variance of 
activations in LiFG (e.g., MDDs may activate LiFG more diffusely than HCs).  While 
exploring variance in activations is relatively new when it comes to imaging data 
(researchers typically control for this variable, rather than measure it) variability has 
turned out to be an important measure in other subfields of psychology and behavioral 
science (Mischel & Shoda 1995,1998; Segerstrom & Nes, 2007; Riley & Turvey, 2002).   
With that said, there has been some recent fMRI research exploring variance in 
the fMRI signal as a dependent measure.  Garrett et al, (2010) found that variance in the 
BOLD signal during fixation periods differentiated older and younger adults with five 
times the predictive power of an amplitude-based analysis. Other research has shown that 
variance in the fMRI signal predicted psychotic symptoms for people with schizophrenia 
(Winterer et al., 2006a); it has been explored in other contexts as well (Musso et al., 
2006; Winterer et al., 2006b).  In addition, in Bush‘s (2010) recent review, he calls for 
more research examining variability in fMRI signals as they pertain to ADHD as such 
―noise‖ could be related to  decreased dopamine levels and could help to evaluate 
hypoactivation in ADHD groups.  Therefore, exploring both spatial and temporal 





Participants and Measures 
Thirty-two right-handed adults (21 females; mean age=24.4 years) participated in 
this study. Sixteen participants met criteria for MDD as assessed by the Structured 
Clinical Interview (SCID)
12
 and 16 had no current or past Axis I pathology. All SCID 
diagnoses were confirmed by a second, independent interviewer. Participants also 
completed the Ruminative Response Styles (RRS) questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) that assesses the degree to 
which participants engage in rumination with depressive content, and the Beck 
Depression Inventory II (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), that assesses severity of 
depressive symptomatology. Three participants were excluded from all analyses (one for 
having poor fMRI normalization; one for dropping out of the experiment midway; and 
one for not performing the word-rating task at the end of the study), leaving 15 MDDs 
and 14 HCs for the final analyses
13
.  
Materials and Procedures 
Participants saw a display of four words on a computer screen. Two words were 
presented in blue and two in red. Participants were instructed to encode and remember all 
four words. After a four-second delay, participants saw either a blue or red color patch 
indicating the color of the words they were now to remember; the words in the other 
color were to be forgotten. Following a jittered cue-to-stimulus interval (CSI) of 4, 6, 8, 
or 10 seconds (average CSI = 7 seconds), participants saw a single probe word and 
                                                 
12 Six of the 16 MDDs had or were taking medication for depression. 





pressed a ―yes‖ key if that word was one of the two words they were to remember, and a 
―no‖ key if it was not one of the two words they were to remember. The Inter-trial-
Interval (ITI) was jittered to be 4, 6, 8, or 10 seconds (average ITI = 7 seconds).  
There were two types of ―no‖ trials, the trials of main interest here: ―control‖ 
probes were words not seen in over 100 trials on average, and ―lure‖ probes were words 
drawn from the to-be-forgotten set of the current trial. Previous research has 
demonstrated that people are both delayed and less accurate in responding to lure trials 
than to control trials (Nee et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2003). The difference in performance 
between lure and control trials indexes how well participants are able to control the 
contents of STM and to resolve interference. The task used in this study required 
participants to forget and remember both positively and negatively valenced items. 
Because of the high level of rumination by MDDs about negative material (Beck, 1967; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2009), we hypothesized that MDD 
participants (but not HC participants) would have more difficulty saying ―no‖ to 
negatively valenced lures than they would to positively valenced lures, indexed by 
increased reaction time and decreased accuracy. 
Participants first practiced 32 trials of the directed-forgetting task with words that 
they would not see again in the study. All words were selected from the Affective Norms 
of English Words (ANEW; Bradley and Lang, 1999). Words were specifically selected 
that were positively or negatively valenced according to ANEW norms to increase the 
likelihood that participants would perceive the words as differentially valenced. The 
mean ANEW valence was 3.15 for the negative words and 7.21 for the positive words. 




1.12; positive: mean = 5.48, s.d. = 1.12) and frequency (negative: mean = 24.9, s.d. = 
36.1; positive: mean = 27.6, s.d. = 27.3). As described below, participants were asked to 
rate the valence of each word at the end of the experiment, and these idiosyncratic ratings 
were used in our behavioral and neural analyses so that the effect of affective valence as 
perceived by each subject individually could be examined. The experimental task 
contained 192 trials: 24 lure negative trials, 24 lure positive trials, 24 control negative 
trials, 24 control positive trials, 48 ―yes‖ negative trials and 48 ―yes‖ positive trials
14
. 
Participants completed 12 runs of the experiment (in 2 sessions of 6 runs each; see Figure 
3-1). 
 
Figure 3-1: Schematic Diagram of the Valenced Directed Forgetting task. Each run 
consisted of 16 trials that were balanced for the different trial-type combinations, lasted 7 
minutes and 38 seconds, and included 16 seconds of fixation at the beginning and end of 
each run. 
 
                                                 





After completing session 1 (approximately 1.25 hours), participants filled out the 
BDI and the RRS questionnaires. They then performed a short automated operation span 
task in which they had to remember words while simultaneously solving math problems 
(Unsworth et al., 2005). Following these tasks, participants returned to the scanner to 
complete session 2 (also approximately 1.25 hours).  The experiment was divided into 
two sessions to avoid the fatigue that would be caused by 2.5 hours of continuous 
scanning time
15
. After completing session 2, participants had three minutes to recall as 
many words as they could from the experiment. Following this, participants rated each 
word from the experiment on a scale from 1 to 7 indicating how negative or positive that 





Images were acquired on a GE Signa 3-Tesla scanner equipped with a standard 
quadrature head coil. Functional T2* weighted images were acquired using a spiral 
sequence with 40 contiguous slices with 3.44×3.44×3 mm voxels (repetition time 
(TR)=2000 ms; echo time (TE)=30 ms; flip angle=90°; field of view (FOV)=22 cm). A 
T1-weighted gradient echo anatomical overlay was acquired using the same FOV and 
slices (TR=250 ms, TE=5.7 ms, flip angle=90°). Additionally, a 124-slice high-resolution 
T1-weighted anatomical image was collected using spoiled-gradient-recalled acquisition 
                                                 
15 We realigned all of our functional images together from session 1 & 2 and coregistered and normalized 
them all to the same high resolution anatomical image separately for each subject.  
16 Due to a programming error, 27 participants did not rate 12 of the 444 words, which led, on average, to 5 




(SPGR) in steady-state imaging (TR=9 ms, TE=1.8 ms, flip angle=15°, FOV=25–26 cm, 
slice thickness=1.2 mm). 
Each SPGR anatomical image was corrected for signal in-homogeneity and skull-
stripped using FSL's Brain Extraction Tool (Smith et al., 2004). These images were then 
normalized with SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London); the 
normalization parameters for warping to the standard MNI template were recorded. These 
normalization parameters were applied to the functional images maintaining their original 
3.44×3.44×3mm resolution, and they were spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 
8mm. Functional images were corrected for differences in slice timing using 4-point sinc-
interpolation (Oppenheim et al., 1999) and were corrected for head movement using 
MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002). To reduce noise from spike artifacts, we implemented 
AFNI‘s de-spiking algorithms. Voxel time series were temporally high-pass filtered at 
.0078Hz. 
 
fMRI analysis parameters 
Our functional images were entered into a general linear model in which fixation 
(at the beginning and end of each run), the stimulus display (all negative items, all 
positive items, and half negative and half positive items separately), the remember cue 
and the probe were modeled.  There were 3 types of probes: Lure, Control, and Yes trial 
probe words which were modeled separately based on participant ratings. Words with 
ratings of 1 or 2 were categorized as negative, of 3-5 as neutral, and of 6 or 7 as positive. 
MDD and HC participants did not differ significantly in the number of words they rated 




t(28) = 7.8, p < .001. This fMRI analysis matched many of our behavioral analyses in 
which similar valence trials were aggregated.  Incorrect trials were modeled separately, as 
well as probe words that had missing word ratings. Furthermore, 24 motion regressors 
were added into our model that included the linear, squared, derivative, and squared 
derivative of the six rigid-body movement parameters (Lund et al., 2005) resulting in a 
total of 40 regressors (some participants did not have incorrect trials or un-rated words 
resulting in 38 regressors for those participants). 
For all fMRI analyses a threshold of p < .005 (uncorrected) at the voxel-level was 
used, which was then corrected using a cluster-size threshold of 20 contiguous voxels 
producing a p < .05 (corrected) threshold (Forman et al., 1995).  
 
Behavioral Analysis 
Our analyses focused on the ‗no‘ response trials because examining participants‘ 
ability to expel information from STM was of interest. To correct for outliers, trials for 
which reaction times (RTs) were either greater than 3 standard deviations from each 
participant‘s mean (calculated separately for each trial type) or less than 400 msec were 
excluded (a standard procedure used to trim reaction time data).  On average this 
trimming procedure removed only 1.35% of trials. The resulting means for the correct 
trials were used in our analyses. We hypothesized that, compared with HCs, MDDs 
would show a larger Lure – Control difference for negative words than for positive words 
(i.e., slower RTs, more errors).  To test for this, two 2 (Group: MDD vs. HC) x 2 (Trial 




of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted (one on RTs and one on accuracy), with group as 




MDDs had more difficulty removing negative information from short-term 
memory than controls, but no differences were found between groups when removing 
positively valenced information from short-term memory.  A 2 (Group: MDD vs. HC) X 
2 (Trial Type: Lure vs. Control) X 2 (Valence: Positive vs. Negative) ANOVA was 
performed on our behavioral data.    There was a highly reliable main effect of trial type 
as responses to Lure trials were less accurate, F(1,28) = 11.352, p <.005, and slower, RT 
F(1,28) = 81.85, p <.001.  There was not, however, a reliable Group X Trial Type 
interaction for RT, F(1,28) = 1.473, n.s. or accuracy, F(1,28) = 1.759, n.s., nor was there 
a reliable Trial Type X valence interaction for RT, F(1,28) = 2.275, n.s. or accuracy, 
F(1,28) = 1.611, n.s.  Critically, for RT, there was a reliable 3-way interaction of Group 
X Trial Type X Valence as MDDs and HCs differed in the Lure – Control contrast by 
valence, F(1,28) = 5.12, p <.05.  These results show that MDDs have more difficulty than 
HCs in resolving interference from negatively valenced items.  These results also seem 
not to be driven by a more generic effect of Group or Valence as evidenced by the two 
null 2-way interactions.  These effects were explored in greater detail with planned 
comparison t-tests on RT, and MDDs had a greater Lure – Control difference than HCs 




valenced words, t(27) = .04, n.s.  Also, MDDs had a reliably larger Lure – Control 
difference for negatively valenced words than to positively valenced words, t(14) = 2.23, 
p < .05.  These results can be seen in Figure 3-2 and Table 3-1.  There were no 
differences by valence for HCs.  None of these valence effects was reliable with accuracy 
as the dependent variable.   
  Individual Ratings of Valence  
 Lure Neg Lure Pos Control Neg Control Pos 
MDD     
RT 1095.31 (76) 1027.07 (74) 876.03 (63) 882.11 (52) 
Acc  0.89 (.04) 0.92 (.04) 0.99 (.01) 0.99 (.01) 
     
HC     
RT  882.92 (39) 895.64 (42) 751.31 (34) 749.17 (30) 
Acc  0.95 (.02) 0.97 (.02) 0.99 (.01) 1.00 (0.0) 
 
 
Table 3-1: Mean RTs and accuracies for word valence as determined individual 
participants‘ ratings of the words.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
 In sum, these results show that MDDs, in contrast to HCs, are slower to remove 
negatively valenced information from STM than positive. In a separate analysis using all 
the word ratings, not just the extremes, we confirmed this finding.  The slope of the 
function relating the Lure – Control contrast to ratings of valence was reliably different 
for the two groups, t(27) = 2.40, p < .05.  For MDDs, as the valence of the words became 
more positive, the Lure – Control difference became smaller.  In contrast, HCs displayed 




effect lies in the extremes of valence, the effect also exists at intermediate levels of 
valence.  These plots can be seen in Figure 3-3. 
  
Figure 3-2: Mean Correct RT for the Lure – Control contrast for the most negatively 
(ratings of 1 and 2) and positively (ratings of 6 and 7) rated words for both MDDs and 
HCs. Here valence was determined by each individual participant. MDDs exhibit more 
difficulty MDDs exhibit more difficulty in removing negative information from STM 







Figure 3-3 Mean Correct RT for the Lure – Control contrast for each valence rating. 
Valence was determined by each individual participant. MDDs exhibit more difficulty in 
removing negative information from STM compared to positive. HCs show the opposite 
pattern. T The top linear equation explains the pattern for MDDs, while the bottom linear 
equation explains the pattern for HCs. 
 
Additional Behavioral Effects  
Rumination Response Styles inventory scores (RRS, Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow, 1991; Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) were correlated with the 
difference in RT for the Lure - Control contrast for negative valence minus positive 
valence.  As seen in Figure 3-4, the more participants ruminated, the more difficulty they 
had removing negatively valenced information from STM versus positively valenced 
information, r = .43, t(29) = 2.5, p < .05.  This result was nearly identical when Lure Neg 
– Lure Pos RTs were correlated with RRS, yielding a reliable value, r = .42, t(29) = 2.43, 
p < .05.  This shows that it was the Lure trials that were driving these results.  These 
same correlations were explored substituting the full-RRS scores with the brooding and 




RT differences for Lure – Control Negative vs. Lure – Control Positive, r = .31, t(29) = 
1.73, p < .1, but no trend existed for reflection scores, r = .16, t(29) = .85, n.s.  These 
results further corroborate that the difficulty in expelling negative relative to positive 
information is related to negative forms of rumination (e.g., brooding) and not to general 
pondering (e.g., reflection). Operation span scores
17
 were also reliably lower for MDDs 
than HCs, t(27) = 2.23 p < .05
18
 , and there was a trend for spans to be negatively 
correlated with rumination scores (r = -.31, p = .10), which all suggest that depressive 
rumination may consume cognitive resources.    
To check whether our directed forgetting effects may be driven by these 
differences in operation span scores, we performed two stepwise regressions.  For the 
first, RTs for the Lure – Control contrast for negatively valenced words were used as the 
dependent measure, with depression status (MDD vs. HC) and operation span scores as 
potential regressors.  Our criterion for inclusion was having a p-value for the regressor < 
.05, and our criterion for exclusion was having a p-value > .10.  For this stepwise 
regression, only depression status was entered, and operation span scores were excluded.  
We performed a second stepwise regression with the same regressors, but changed the 
dependent variable to the difference in RT for the Lure - Control contrast for negatively 
valenced words vs. the Lure – Control contrast for positively valenced words.  Again, 
only depression status was included and operation span scores were excluded.  Based on 
these analyses, it seems that the differences in the directed-forgetting task were not driven 
by differences in operation span scores. 
                                                 
17 We used the total score as the operation measure where any correct trial was counted as correct.  
Participants did not need to get 2/3 of trials correct at each load level to be counted as correct. 




At the conclusion of the experiment, participants were asked to recall as many 
words as as possible regardless of whether the words were to-be-remembered or to-be-
forgotten (since words were repeated 4 times throughout the course of the experiment, a 
word could appear as a to-be-remembered item on one trial, and a to-be –forgotten item 
on a later trial, or vice versa).  MDD‘s recalled more negatively valenced words (8.2 
negative vs. 5.7 positive), and HC‘s recalled more positively valenced words (8.1 positive 
vs. 5.7 negative), producing a reliable group x valence interaction, F(1,28) = 7.8 p < .01.   
Lastly, these effects were explored separately for our non-medicated MDDs (9 
participants) vs. HCs.  All of these behavioral effects were found reliable, but the 
directed-forgetting 3-way interaction was reduced to a trend.  This may be because the 
medicated MDDs had more severe forms of depression or because we had reduced power 
for this contrast due to the smaller sample size.   
 
Figure 3-4: The difference in the Lure – Control contrast for the most negatively and 








These behavioral results show differences between MDDs and HCs in removing 
negatively valenced information from STM:  MDDs had more difficulty doing so.   The 
fMRI results were analyzed to uncover the neural mechanisms that may support these 
differences, to better understand why MDDs are deficient in removing negatively 
valenced information from mind.   
Similarities in Magnitude of Activation 
For the Lure – Control contrast at the onset of the probe, both groups robustly 
activated a network that has been repeatedly implicated in interference resolution for 
verbal material, including left inferior frontal gyrus (LiFG), dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), and left and right parietal cortex (Nee, Jonides and Berman, 2007; Zhang 
et al., 2003).  In order to quantify this overlap, the group-averaged t-statistical maps for 
the Lure – Control contrast were separately calculated for MDDs
19
 and HCs.  These two 
statistical maps (Lure – Control group contrast for MDDs and HCs) were then correlated 
to obtain a single Pearson correlation coefficient across all brain voxels.  A correlation of 
.50 was found indicating substantial similarity in the networks supporting the two groups.  
Furthermore, when we focused on the activation only in the LiFG (defined anatomically 
from the WFU PickAtlas), the correlation increased to .60.  
                                                 
19 One MDD was not included in probe results because that participant had only 50% accuracy on Lure 




Of course, the behavioral data show that valence matters.  Therefore, the Lure 
Neg – Control Neg contrast was examined in the anatomically defined LiFG region of 
interest (ROI).  There was no difference when comparing the magnitude of activation for 
the two groups.  We also performed whole brain analyses comparing the two groups for 
the Lure Neg – Control Neg and Lure Pos – Control Pos contrasts, but found few 
differences between the groups at conservative statistical thresholds.  All of these results 
suggest that the two groups activate similar networks to the same magnitude when 
suppressing positive and negative information.  
While few differences were found between groups for these contrasts, some 
differences were found with a multiple regression using RRS scores as a predictor.  This 
analysis is similar to the analysis that was performed on the behavioral data when we 
correlated RRS scores with the difference in RT for the Lure – Control contrast for 
negatively valenced items vs. RT for the Lure – Control contrast for positively valenced 
items and when we performed this correlation on the Lure trials only (Lure Neg – Lure 
Pos).  For this analysis we used RRS as a predictor for differences in activation for Lure 
Neg – Lure Pos (we focused on the Lure trials, because those trials seemed to be driving 
the behavioral correlation).  This regression produced a significant result in the right 
inferior parietal lobe (BA 40) centered at x = 62, y = -41, z = 45 and contained 39 
contiguous voxels.  This region is commonly activated for the Lure – Control contrast 
and activates for sensory and attentional processing (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002).  
Focusing on this region alone may not be entirely correct though.  If the threshold was 
decreased to admittedly low thresholds such as p < .05 uncorrected for 20 contiguous 




fronto-parietal network.  This analysis shows that the greater the rumination score, the 
more participants need to engage this frontal-parietal network to resolve interference 
from negatively valenced Lures compared to positively valenced Lures, thereby 
complimenting our behavioral analyses.        
Differences in Spatial Variance 
Few differences were found between the two groups when exploring activation 
magnitude, though there were some effects when RRS scores were used as a predictor.  
However, as we indicated above, what may be telling in differentiating the groups might 
be differences in the variance of activations, not in the overall magnitude.  Therefore, we 
examined spatial variance, for which we differences between the groups, specifically in 
LiFG. When spatial variance of activations was examined within this ROI for each 
participant for the Lure Neg – Control Neg contrast, MDDs showed more spatial variance 
than HCs, t(27) = 2.8, p < .01 (This spatial variance difference was still reliable when we 
excluded our medicated MDD participants.). This variance difference can be seen in 
Figure 3-4, which displays a 3-dimensional rendering of the LiFG for both groups with 
activations superimposed in a wiremesh plot.  We used the marching cubes algorithm 
(Lorensen & Cline, 1987) to compute these three dimensional wireframe representations 
of the contour curves as implemented in the misc3d package in the statistical program R. 
Exploring Figure 3-5, one can see that HCs activate more focally in LiFG and 
MDDs activate more diffusely.  Spatial variance in the ROI also correlated impressively 
with the behavioral difference for Lure_Neg – Control_Neg in RT (r = .60, p <.001)
20
; 
                                                 
20 When two participants were removed from this analysis because they may have been outliers, this 




because we were concerned that the correlation might be driven by two outlier points, we 
ran a robust regression in MATLAB (The Mathworks Inc., MATLAB version R2008b) 
with the robustfit function using the Huber weight function and still obtained a significant 
correlation (r = .35, p < .01).   In addition, there was a trend for the spatial variance for 
the Lure Neg – Control Neg contrast to correlate positively with RRS scores, r = .34, 
t(29) = 1.9, p < .1. 
 
Figure 3-5: Three-dimensional renderings of LiFG for MDDs on the left and HCs on 
the right for the Lure_Neg – Control_Neg contrast. Deactivations are in blue, and 
activations are in yellow/red.  From the figure one can see that MDDs activate LiFG 
more diffusely, while HCs activate this region more focally, with activation clusters 
centering in lower to middle portions of the LiFG.  Contrast values range from -1.5 (blue) 
to +1.5 (red). 
 
The spatial variance difference was not seen everywhere in the brain; for 




PickAtlas) did not show spatial variance differences between the two groups, t(27) = 1.8, 
n.s.  In addition, the spatial variance effect does not appear for all contrasts:  For the Lure 
Pos – Control Pos contrast, no differences were found in spatial variance in LiFG 
between the two groups, t(27) = 1.5, n.s.  Therefore, it appears that there is some 
selectivity to the spatial variance difference between the two groups as it was seen more 
for the negatively valenced contrasts in LiFG, which is critical for this and other 
interference-resolution tasks. 
 To explore more how these variance differences in LiFG manifest themselves for 
the Lure Neg – Control Neg contrasts, a clustering analysis was performed on the 
activation contrast values in LiFG.  An unsupervised clustering algorithm
21
 (Kaufman & 
Rousseeuw, 1990; Mathematica v 7.0 Wolfram Research Inc., 2008) was run on the 
group activation maps in LiFG, and more clusters were found for MDDs (7 clusters) than 
for HCs (3 clusters).  This analysis supports the claim of a wider distribution of activation 
for the MDDs, as Figure 4 suggests visually. This analysis, in conjunction with the visual 
display of LiFG from Figure 4, suggests that MDDs are activating this region more 
diffusely than HCs, and that the degree of diffuseness or variance may affect the ability 
of MDDs to remove negative information from short-term memory. 
 There is, however, an alternative explanation for the variance result, which is that 
MDDs are not uniformly more spatially varied than HCs, but rather are activating a 
separate region(s) within LiFG that HCs are not activating.  For example, exploring 
Figure 4, it appears that MDDs may be activating a superior portion of the LiFG that HCs 
                                                 
21 This method is based on the minimization of the silhouette statistic (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 1990), 




may not be activating.  To test this idea, two separate functional ROIs were built based on 
the group data for the Lure – Control contrast across all subjects, one centered in the 
inferior portion of LiFG (x = -31, y = 31, z = 0) and one centered on the superior portion 
(x = -41, y = 6, z = 33).  Differences in spatial variance were tested in these two regions 
as well as differences in mean activation, and no reliable differences were found for 
either ROI.  This analysis suggests that MDDs are not activating a separate sub-area 
within the LiFG.  Figure 3-6 provides an alternative representation of the data, which 
shows a more uniform spatial variance difference across the ROI.  This chromosome-
style plot shows activation for both groups for the Lure Neg – Control Neg contrast at 
each slice through Z across the x-axis (from 1 -22).  Activation is shown for every x,y 
pair at each z-slice level.  Each subject is represented by a different color and 
alphanumeric symbol.  From Figure 5 it is apparent that the spatial variance effect seems 





Figure 3-6: Chromosome style plot of LiFG for the Lure Neg – Control Neg contrast.  
The y-axis shows the contrast score for each voxel in LiFG for each participant.  The X-
axis is showing the different slices through Z, from 1 to 22.  MDDs are displayed in the 
top panel and HCs are displayed in the bottom panel. We have vectorized the data over x 
and y, but each x and y pair is represented separately, and each subject is represented by a 
different color and alphanumeric symbol.  From the figure it is apparent that MDDs show 
greater spatial variance at each slice through Z, indicating that the variance effect appears 




 These differences in neural spatial variance inspired the exploration of variance 




Type: Lure vs. Control) X 2 (Valence: Positive and Negative) ANOVA with variance in 
RT as the dependent measure.  Variance for each of the four trial types was calculated 
separately for each individual participant.  We found a reliable 3-way interaction, in 
which variance differed by Group, Trial type, and Valence, F(1,28) = 5.082, p < .05.  
Exploring this interaction more directly with post-hoc t-tests, we found a significant 
difference between MDDs and HCs for Lure Neg variance, t(28) = 2.80, p < .01, but not 
for the other trial types, so it appears to be the Lure Neg trials that drive the variance 
differences between groups in RT.  In addition, a reliable positive relationship was found 
between variance for the Lure Neg – Control Neg contrast in RT, with the amount of 
spatial variance for the Lure Neg – Control Neg contrast, t(27) = .389, p < .05.  This 
analysis suggests that more noise in the fMRI signal, the more noise there is behaviorally, 
indicating a tight coupling between neural and behavioral variance. 
 
Temporal Variance 
 Differences in temporal variance between MDDs and HCs were also explored.  It 
could be that MDDs may be more varied in their activations over time, which may lead to 
some inabilities to resolve interference for negatively valenced items.  This analysis was 
restricted to the Lure Neg condition and whole brain data for the scans corresponding to 
the trials when the Lure Negative probe word was shown.  Two TRs from each trial type 
were taken.  In addition, motion-related activity from the functional data was covaried 
out.  These TR data were then concatenated and the variance in activation for each voxel 
across time was calculated.  Since LiFG was of most interest, the temporal variance of all 




groups.  When doing so, no differences were found in temporal variance t(27) = .66, n.s. 
in LiFG. 
Summary 
 It appears that there are no differences in the magnitude of activation between the 
two groups even when the analysis was restricted to the LiFG.  However, MDDs 
activated this region more diffusely than HCs, which was related to worse abilities to 
remove negative information from STM and was associated with greater behavioral 
variance in RT.  Finally, no differences in temporal variance (i.e., more varied activations 
over time) were found between these two groups. 
Discussion 
In this study, MDDs experienced more difficulty removing negative information 
from STM but not positive information, extending the results of Joormann and Gotlib 
(2008) and Joormann et al., (2010) by relating behavioral findings directly to rumination 
and by uncovering the neural mediators of the directed-forgetting effects.  
MDDs also had lower operation span scores, which corroborate hypotheses that 
depressive rumination may consume cognitive resources. Other research has shown that 
lower memory span scores are related to more task-unrelated thoughts (Kane et al., 2007) 
and less ability to suppress unwanted thoughts (Brewin and Smart, 2005). These results 
could indicate a harsh self-sustaining cycle for MDDs, in which ruminative thoughts 
could lower STM spans by increasing the amount of negative task-unrelated thoughts, 




differences in operation span scores were found between groups, these differences did not 
drive our directed-forgetting results. 
Importantly, both MDD and HC participants activated similar neural networks to 
resolve interference. MDDs, however, had greater spatial variance in activations in LiFG 
than did HCs, even though both groups activated this region to a similar magnitude.  
These differences in spatial variance may indicate that MDD‘s are not as effective at 
using the mechanisms of this region to resolve the interference that is caused by 
negatively valenced conflicting probes, leading to their larger behavioral interference 
effect for this valence.  In support of this noisy interference resolution process is the 
correlation that was found between spatial variance and behavioral variance for the Lure 
Neg – Control Neg contrast in RT.  Elucidating the direction of this relationship, 
however, will require further research. 
The physiological significance of spatial variance result may be related to 
dopamine.  As Bush (2010) mentions, increased ‗noise‘ in the fMRI signal may be 
attributable to decreased dopamine levels, which serve to dampen background neural 
firing noise.  In fact, Winterer, et al. (2006b) found that Val polymorphic carriers of the 
COMT gene (who have less available synaptic dopamine) show less mean activation (i.e., 
smaller magnitude) and more varied activation in pre-frontal areas in a visual odd-ball 
task.  These results suggest that dopamine may help to sharpen fMRI signals and 
suppress surrounding noise (Winterer et al., 2006b).  A similar argument could be made 
and applied to depression.  It is thought that people suffering from major depression have 
reduced dopamine neurotransmission levels relative to healthy controls (Hasler et al., 




HCs, may be a reflection of decreased dopamine levels, which may hinder MDDs‘ ability 
to dampen background neural noise.  Our effects were selective to negatively valenced 
stimuli, which may indicate that there is more noise for MDDs to suppress when negative 
information has entered short-term memory, but MDDs may not be able to suppress such 
noise due to a lack of dopamine.  While admittedly speculative, rumination may be the 
culprit for increased noise/background neural firing for negatively valenced trials.        
We would like to caution, however, that we are not claiming that spatial variance 
is ―the‖ variable that distinguishes MDDs from HCs.  Different tasks and designs may 
produce differences between groups in activation magnitude as well, as many authors 
have shown (Sheline et al., 2001; Siegle et al., 2002; Elliott et al., 2002; Engels et al., 
2010).  However, adding spatial variance as a potential dependent measure may have 
probative value.  
There has been some controversy surrounding the directed-forgetting procedure 
and more generally whether memories can be suppressed (Anderson and Green, 2001). 
The most common directed-forgetting paradigms are usually implemented with a list-
method procedure in which participants are instructed to remember a list of words and 
then given some instruction to forget that list and learn a new list.  Then participants are 
usually tested by trying to recall as many words as they can from either list.  Some 
controversy has surrounded this task, and whether directed-forgetting affects recall 
(Bjork, LaBerge & Legrand, 1968) and not recognition (Block, 1971; Elmes, Adams & 
Roediger, 1970), or whether it affects both (Benjamin, 2006).  More specifically, the 
debate centers on whether the processes of directed forgetting involve retrieval inhibition 




outside the realm of our paradigm, one could still ask whether our effects are due to 
impaired inhibitory mechanisms or impaired selective rehearsal.  Unfortunately, our 
present data cannot speak to this issue directly, and future research will be needed to 
answer this question.  Whether the impaired process involves insufficient inhibition, 
rehearsal or both, the impairment seems to be selective to negatively valenced stimuli for 
MDDs.    
In sum, although MDDs have the ability to resolve interference in STM, they 
have more difficulty in resolving interference for negative than for positive stimuli, and 
this difficulty is related to the propensity to ruminate.  As such, the inability to remove 
negative information from STM may be a mechanism of rumination. Moreover, MDDs 
do not activate LiFG as efficiently/focally as do HCs in resolving interference for 
negative stimuli, which is related to their behavioral difficulties and increased behavioral 
variance for negative material. In turn, depression may be perpetuated by the difficulty 
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Chapter 4  
Depression, Rumination, and the Default Network 
 
Abstract 
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) has been characterized by excessive default-network 
activation and connectivity with the subgenual cingulate.   These hyper-connectivities are 
often interpreted as reflecting rumination, where MDDs perseverate on negative, self-
referential thoughts.  However, the relationship between connectivity and rumination has 
not been established.  Furthermore, previous research has not examined how connectivity 
with the subgenual cingulate differs when individuals are engaged in a task or not.  The 
purpose of the present study was to examine connectivity of the default network 
specifically in the subgenual cingulate both on- and off-task, and to examine the 
relationship of connectivity to rumination. Analysis using a seed-based connectivity 
approach revealed that MDDs show more neural functional connectivity between the 
posterior-cingulate cortex and the subgenual-cingulate cortex than healthy individuals 
during rest periods, but not during task engagement.  Importantly, these rest-period 






Rumination is defined as ―a mode of responding to distress that involves 
repetitively and passively focusing on symptoms of distress and on the possible causes 
and consequences of these symptoms‖ (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 
2008).  This tendency to ruminate characterizes depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008), and it has been ascribed to deficient control processes that cannot 
rid memory of negative information (Joormann, 2005).  As such, a growing literature has 
examined the relationship between depressive rumination and cognitive control during 
demanding cognitive tasks.   
However, it is likely that the most prominent display of rumination is not when 
people are engaged in a task, but when they are at rest. Examining how MDDs and 
healthy controls (HCs) compare during such rest periods is important because interleaved 
with the ongoing tasks of life are significant periods in which people do not engage in 
structured tasks, and instead are left to mind-wander or ruminate.  Interestingly, recent 
research has shown the high propensity of people to mind-wander, which has been 
estimated to be around 10-15% of their wakeful hours
22
 (Sayette, Reichle, & Schooler, 
2009).  Neurally, mind-wandering appears to engage regions of a ―default network‖ 
(Christoff, et al., 2009, Mason et al., 2007).   The default network has been defined as a 
set of neural regions that activate in unison during off-task or ―rest‖ periods, which 
include the posterior-cingulate, portions of lateral parietal cortex, as well as portions of 
the medial temporal lobe and medial prefrontal cortex (Fox et al., 2005; Raichle, 2010; 
Shulman et al., 1997; Raichle et al., 2001).  
                                                 




Recent research examining the default network has revealed striking differences 
between MDDs and HCs. MDDs show increased default-network connectivity (compared 
with HCs) with the subgenual-cingulate cortex (a region located in the medial prefrontal 
cortex), which is positively correlated with the length of MDDs‘ current depressive 
episodes (Greicius et al., 2007).  Other researchers have shown abnormalities in the 
subgenual cingulate for MDDs (Sheline et al., 2009 see Drevets, Price, and Furey, 2008 
for a review), and this brain region has also been linked to poor emotional regulation 
(Abler, Hofer, and Viviani, 2008) and is activated more when healthy young adults were 
induced to ruminate (Kross et al., 2009).  Moreover, stimulation of white matter tracts 
leading to the subgenual cingulate in MDDs has been associated with remission of 
depression concomitant with a decrease in hyperactivity of the subgenual-cingulate itself 
(Mayberg et al., 2005).  It should not be surprising then to find differences between 
MDDs and HCs in the subgenual cingulate.   
  Even with all of this research, it is not clear what cognitive processes are 
reflected by these differences in default network connectivity (indeed, if they reflect them 
at all; Raichle, 2010) and more specifically with hyper-connectivity in the subgenual 
cingulate. Although some researchers have speculated that this hyper-connectivity 
reflects rumination (Greicius et al., 2007), no research has directly tested this hypothesis; 
so, the first goal of the present research was to test whether default-network connectivity, 
especially in the subgenual cingulate, is related to rumination.    
A second goal of this research was to examine how differences between MDDs 
and HCs in default-network connectivity changed when participants were on-task versus 




(Sayette, Reichle, & Schooler, 2009; Christoff et al., 2009). For example, the accountant 
at work may focus intensely on a balance sheet, but divert attention intermittently to 
thoughts unrelated to this task.  In the present research, the relationship between default-
state connectivity and rumination was examined using a situation that approximates such 
real-world conditions.  The relationship between rumination and default-network 
connectivity was explored when participants performed a demanding short-term memory 
task interleaved with periods of rest. Alternating between rest and task epochs in this 
manner allowed us to explore whether default-network connectivity for MDDs and HCs 
varied between off-task and on-task periods.   In addition, the relationships between self-
report measures of rumination and default-network connectivity could then be compared 
for rest and task epochs separately. 
In sum, this work was designed to examine whether measures of rumination 
predicted connectivity of the default state especially in the subgenual cingulate for 
depressed and healthy individuals, whether connectivity differences at rest persisted for 
on-task epochs, and whether the relationship between rumination and default-network 
connectivity varied for on-task and off-task periods. 
 
Methods and Materials 
Participants and Behavioral Measures 
Default-network connectivity in 15 MDDs (10 female, 5 male, mean age = 25.7) 
and 15 HCs (10 female, 5 male, mean age = 23), was explored during non-task fixation 




conducted in a functional magnetic resonance imaging environment.   The short-term 
memory task was a variant of a directed forgetting task (Nee, Jonides, and Berman, 
2007), in which participants were initially instructed to remember 4 words, and after a 
delay were instructed to forget half of the words and remember the other half. After 
another delay interval, participants saw a single word and responded yes or no if that 
word was one of the words in the to-be-remembered set.  Sometimes the single words 
were words from the to-be-forgotten set, and the ability of MDDs and HCs to forget 
positively valenced vs. negatively valenced words was examined.  A more detailed 
explanation of the task can be found in Chapter 3. 
The Diagnosis of MDD was determined with a Structured Clinical Interview for 
the DSM-IV (SCID) by an advanced clinical psychology graduate student and was 
confirmed by a second independent rater.  Behavioral rumination scores were measured 
with the Rumination Response Styles (RRS) inventory (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003), and depressive severity was also assessed with the Beck Depression 
Inventory II (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).  The RRS measured rumination 
subjectively with questions such as: ―[How often do you] think ‗What am I doing to 
deserve this?‘‖ or ―[How often do you] think ‗Why do I always react this way?‘‖ 
Participants responded with a 4-point scale ranging from 1-almost never, to 4-almost 
always.  There were 22 items in total.  The RRS can further be subdivided into 3 
components: brooding, reflection and depression related items (Treynor, Gonzalez, and 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003).  MDDs and HCs differed significantly on brooding, the full 




scores.  These scores can be seen in Table 4-1. Six MDDs were medicated, and two 
MDDs had co-morbid anxiety
23
.   
                                                 
23 We did not find any differences between medicated and non-medicated MDDs in any rumination scores, 









Table 4-1: Descriptive Statistics for MDDs (1.00) and HCs (.00) for the different subjective measures including the 







Images were acquired on a GE Signa 3-T scanner equipped with a standard 
quadrature head coil.  Functional T2* weighted images were acquired using a spiral 
sequence with 40 contiguous slices with 3.44×3.44×3 mm voxels (TR=2000 ms; TE=30 
ms; flip angle=90°; FOV=22 mm
2
). A T1-weighted gradient echo anatomical overlay was 
acquired using the same FOV and slices (TR=250 ms, TE=5.7 ms, flip angle=90°). 
Additionally, a 124-slice high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical image was collected 
using spoiled-gradient-recalled acquisition (SPGR) in steady-state imaging (TR=9 ms, 
TE=1.8 ms, flip angle=15°, FOV=25–26 mm, slice thickness=1.2 mm). 
Each SPGR image was corrected for signal in-homogeneity and skull-stripped 
using FSL's Brain Extraction Tool (Smith et al., 2004). These images were then 
normalized with SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London), and 
normalization parameters were calculated from the standard MNI template.  These 
parameters were then applied to the functional images maintaining their original 
3.44×3.44×3mm resolution, and were spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 
8×8×8mm.  Functional images were slice-time corrected using a 4-point sinc-
interpolation (Oppenheim, Schafer, & Buck, 1999) and were corrected for head 
movement using MCFLIRT (Jenkison et al., 2002). To reduce the impact of spike 
artifacts, AFNI‘s de-spiking algorithm was implemented.  There were 16 TRs of 
Fixation, 8 at the beginning and end of each run, and 168 TRs of task (where participants 






Default-network connectivity was revealed by selecting a seed voxel in the 
Posterior- Cingulate Cortex (PCC), x = -7, y = -45, z = 24, and that voxel‘s time-course 
was correlated within-subjects for all voxels in the brain.  This seed was selected 
anatomically and is similar in location to regions that other authors have used to define 
the default network (Greicius et al., 2003; Fox et al. 2005; Monk et al., 2009; Raichle, 
2010).  The posterior cingulate has been found to reveal connectivity in the default 
network most effectively (Monk et al., 2009) and is an area of greatest deactivation 
during off-task behavior (Shulman et al., 1997).   
Default-network connectivity was calculated separately for fixation and task 
blocks in which participants performed a short-term memory task.  Task and fixation 
epochs were low-pass filtered, de-trended to remove within-run drift in the fMRI signal 
(de-trending was performed separately for the beginning and end fixations and acts as a 
high-pass filter), and processed to have a mean of ‗0‘ and a standard deviation of ‗1‘ 
separately for each TR, which was done to control for global activation changes that may 
have occurred over time.  These runs were then concatenated together, which may have 
biased the correlations positively, but this potential bias did not interact with group.  
Thus, there were 192 TRs of fixation/rest (6.4 minutes) and 2,016 TRs of task (Inter-
Trial-Intervals were removed).  While this may not be an ideal design due to the 
imbalance in number of TRs, the difference in the number of TRs for task and rest should 
not interact with group, which is of main interest in this study (i.e., comparing MDDs vs. 
HCs during rest, during task, and the difference between rest and task epochs).  




tests in SPM 5.  Results were thresholded at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) at the voxel-level 
and corrected by using a cluster-size threshold of 26 voxels to produce a p < 0.05 
(corrected) threshold (Forman et al., 1995).   
 
Results 
As depicted in Figure 4-1A, both groups showed high connectivity in the default 
network during fixation periods.  A two-sample t-test comparing the default networks for 
MDDs vs. HCs revealed that MDDs had stronger connectivity with the subgenual 
cingulate than HCs (Figure 1B) at standard statistical thresholds. At more liberal 
thresholds, MDDs show more connectivity in other areas as well, which can be seen 
visually in Figure 4-1A.  To explore how rumination scores may relate to connectivity 
between the subgenual cingulate and the posterior cingulate, a functional ROI of the 
subgenual cingulate was created based on the two-sample t-test.  Rumination scores 
(from the RRS) were then correlated with connectivity in this functionally defined region 
of interest (ROI) across all participants, which revealed a very high positive relationship 
(r = .68; p < .001) that can be seen in Figure 4-2A.  This relationship also held for both 
MDDs and HCs separately as exhibited in Figure 4-2B, though the correlations were, of 
course, smaller due to the lower sample sizes and the reduced range of the RRS measure 





Figure 4-1: Default-Network connectivity for MDDs and HCs during fixation periods 
defined by connectivity with posterior-cingulate cortex , x = -7, y = -45, z = 24.  
Correlations above .25 (p < .001) are displayed (A).  Results of a two-sample t-test 
comparing MDDs‘ and HCs‘ default-network connectivity during fixation periods.  
MDDs show more connectivity in the subgenual-cingulate compared to HCs (p < 0.05 






Figure 4-2:  Correlations drawn from the resulting subgenual-cingulate ROI from the 
two-sample t-test comparing the groups at rest.  Subgenual-cingulate (SCC)/posterior-
cingulate (PCC) connectivity correlates positively with subjective rumination scores 
across groups (r = .68, 95% C.I. r = .44 - .85) (A).  Correlations drawn from the resulting 
subgenual-cingulate ROI from the two-sample t-test comparing the groups at rest.  
SCC/PCC connectivity correlates positively with subjective rumination scores for both 
MDDs and HCs.  The linear relationship equation is shown in the upper right for MDDs, 
and lower right for HCs (B).  
 
 
The functionally defined ROI that was  used may be biased in that it was based on 




rumination scores and connectivity in that MDDs have reliably higher RRS scores.  
Therefore, a 10 mm sphere centered on subgenual-cingulate coordinates (x = 6, y = 36, z 
= -4) was constructed from an independent study (Zahn, et al., 2009) and connectivity 
scores were extracted within this ROI.  These connectivity scores were then correlated 
with RRS scores across all participants.  Again, a reliable correlation (r = .53, p < .005; 
Table 1) was found suggesting that default network connectivity with the subgenual 
cingulate is related to ruminative tendencies.   The correlation between RRS scores and 
connectivity was not driven by a main effect of group (i.e., the relationship between RRS 
and PCC-SCC correlations seems to be a continuous positive trend as it was for the 
functionally defined ROI from the two-sample t-test).  In addition, the relationship 
between rumination and connectivity did not reliably differ between groups, Z(30) = 
1.46, n.s.  This may not be too surprising in that HCs also ruminate; they just do so to a 
lesser extent, so the relationship between connectivity and rumination should be the same 
for MDDs and HCs.  In sum, the relationship between rumination and connectivity 



















Table 4-2: Bivariate correlations for all participants for the subjective measures of rumination and depression and the brain 
connectivity scores during rest and task periods extracted using the ROI from (Zahn et al., 2009).  Depression is the sub-scale 





One problem with using the full RRS is that it contains items that assess 
depressive severity, therefore our rumination results may be driven by depression severity 
and not rumination.  To control for this, connectivity scores from the ROI drawn from 
(Zahn et al., 2009) were correlated with the brooding component of the RRS, which does 
not contain items related to depression, yielding a significant positive correlation (r = .44, 
p < .05; Table 4-2).  Unlike brooding, the reflection sub-component of the RRS did not 
correlate with connectivity scores (r = .19, n.s.; Table 4-2).  Furthermore, when reflection 
scores were partialed out from the correlation between brooding and connectivity, the 
relation was unchanged, (r = .41, p < .05).  By contrast, when brooding scores were 
partialed out from the correlation between reflection and connectivity, this relationship 
became mildly although not reliably negative (r = -.12, n.s.).  These two partial 
correlations were also found to be reliably different from one another (Z(30) = 2.04, p < 
.05), which suggests that the correlation between PCC and SCC during rest periods is 
more related to negative forms of rumination than to other forms of continuous thinking 
or pondering. 
These patterns of connectivity in the default network, however, were markedly 
different when participants were engaged in the memory task.  A two-way ANOVA 
conducted on the subgenual-cingulate ROI from Zahn et al., (2009) was used to explore 
rest vs. task-related connectivity and revealed a significant task (rest vs. task) by group 
(MDD vs. HC) interaction (F(1,28) =4.27, p < .05; Figure 3).  Compared with rest, 
MDDs demonstrated significantly reduced connectivity while engaged in a task (t(14) = 




versus rest.  Finally, during task epochs, MDDs and HCs did not differ in subgenual-
cingulate connectivity, t(28) = 1.47, n.s., but did differ reliably for rest epochs as 
expected, t(28) = 3.15, p < .005.  In addition, the correlation between rumination scores 
and connectivity between the PCC and SCC during task epochs was not reliable (r = .347, 
n.s.; Table 1) nor was task connectivity reliably correlated with brooding (r = .294, n.s.; 
Table 1), which suggests that being engaged in a task may disrupt the ability to ruminate 
by distracting participants and thereby interrupting the neural circuit that may mediate 
rumination.      
The correlation of resting-state connectivity and task-related connectivity in the 
sub-genual cingulate was found to be reliably correlated for HCs (r = .63, p < .05), but 
was not reliably correlated for MDDs (r =.38, n.s.).  While this interaction was not 
reliable (potentially due to a lack of power), these results suggest that the ruminative 
connectivity pattern is more dissimilar for task and rest for  MDDs (they may be 
ruminating at rest, but may not be able to during task engagement) than HCs (they may 
be maintaining a similar degree of rumination or mind-wandering throughout) whose 
connectivity patterns remain similar for both task and rest epochs. 
Anand et al. (2007) found some differences in connectivity between the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) and limbic areas after MDDs had been on medication for 6 
weeks.  Six of our MDDs were medicated, thus posterior-cingulate to subgenual-
cingulate connectivities were compared for our medicated and un-medicated groups for 
both task, fixation, and the interaction between the two for both the independent Zahn et 




connectivity between the medicated and non-medicated participants were found, which 
mitigates some concerns that our results may vary based on medication status. 
Another analysis was performed to interrogate whether our results may be 
specific to the posterior cingulate cortex as the seed to define connectivity.  The other 
common seed region that is used to define default mode networks is the medial Pre-
Frontal Cortex (mPFC; Fox et al., 2005, Greicius et al., 2003).  Utilizing mPFC 
coordinates from Fox et al.,( 2005) for the mPFC (x = -1, y = 47, z = -4), default network 
connectivity during fixation was calculated with this mPFC seed utilizing the same 
procedure that was implemented with the posterior cingulate seed.  When the two groups‘ 
connectivity maps were compared at standard whole brain thresholds, no differences 
were found.  However, when an ROI analysis was performed within the posterior 
cingulate cortex, two clusters were discovered in which MDDs showed more connectivity 
in this area at corrected thresholds FWE < .05 (p < .05 for 8 contiguous voxels; 22 voxels 
centered at -10, -45, 24 and 11 voxels at 17, -58,3; there were 455 voxels total in this 
ROI).  This analysis shows that a similar pattern of results is found using the mPFC as the 
seed, however, it is not clear whether the same result should be expected with the mPFC 
as the seed vs. the posterior cingulate. 
In addition, Bar (2009) proposes that rumination may be due to the mPFC 
exhibiting hyper-inhibition of the medial temporal lobe (MTL), which would constrain 
thinking and therefore produce rumination.  A second ROI analysis was performed within 
the MTL (consisting of the hippocampus, para-hippocampus and the amygdala).  Again, 
MDDs showed more connectivity in this area at corrected thresholds FWE < .05 (p < .05 




in the left para-hippocampal gyrus centered at -14, -41, 0; 17 voxels in the right amygdala 
centered at  14, -3, -21; and 18 voxels in the right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus 
centered at 31, -24, -18; there were 978 voxels total in this ROI).  This analysis seems 
consistent with the Bar (2009) hypothesis that hyper-connectivity (that may be due to 
hyper-inhibition) between the mPFC and MTL may lead to increased rumination.    
 
Figure 4-3: The subgenual-cingulate ROI as defined from (Zahn et al., 2009) 
demonstrates a task (rest, task) x group (MDD, HC) interaction highlighting a selective 
difference during periods of quiescence.  No differences were found between groups for 
task epochs. 
 
In summary, these data show that the degree of correlation between the posterior 
cingulate and the subgenual cingulate is related to rumination and may distinguish MDDs 
from HCs, but only during off-task periods.  Furthermore, the relationship between 




correlated with off-task connectivity, but reflection scores did not, which suggests that 
the thought contents during these off-task periods were negative and not entirely driven 
by depression severity.  Therefore, it seems important to explore the relationship between 
rest and task connectivity when comparing MDDs and HCs. 
 
Discussion 
Neural hyper-connectivity with the subgenual-cingulate seems to exist only 
during off-task periods for MDDs, and the connectivity of this area with the posterior 
cingulate is highly related to behavioral assays of depressive rumination.  These results 
build on connectivity differences found in the subgenual cingulate by relating 
connectivity in that area to psychological processes such as rumination and brooding.  
These results also showed that hyper-connectivity at rest existed when rest periods were 
joined with task periods, a finding that may have implications for depression in the wild.  
Lastly, these results showed the selectivity of these neural differences (between MDDs 
and HCs) to off-task periods and that the relationship between ruminative psychological 
processes and connectivity is mitigated by engaging in a task.   
The fact that hyper-connectivity in the subgenual cingulate for MDDs was found 
only during rest or off-task periods supports behavioral research suggesting that 
"distraction"(in our case, responsibility for completing a task) can be effective at 
temporarily relieving rumination and improving mood (Kross and Ayduk, 2008, for a 
review see Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). When MDDs engaged in 




regions.  However, when left to their own thoughts, ruminative processes were engaged. 
This finding has important implications for future neuroimaging research and theory-
building about the cognitive neuroscience of depression.   
Additionally, when the mPFC was used as a seed, some similar results were 
found.  It is noteworthy that differences in the MTL were found, where MDDs showed 
greater connectivity, which could reflect constrained thinking, which Bar outlines as a 
mechanism of rumination.  More work will be needed to flesh out the relationship 
between rumination and constrained thought processing and their relation to the neural 
connectivity, but it seems to be a promising enterprise that could lead to some important 
therapies. 
Some researchers may try to parcel out depression status from rumination, but this 
can be quite challenging considering that depression and rumination are highly 
overlapping constructs.  This is evidenced by the high correlation found between 
rumination scores and  BDI scores  r = .79.  As such, an alternative explanation of our 
findings is that the connectivity between the posterior cingulate and the subgenual 
cingulate reflects depression severity more than rumination. While separating depression 
from rumination is not easily done, brooding scores (which do not contain depression-
related items) correlated positively and reliably with connectivity, which suggests that 
this relationship is not driven by depression severity alone.   Furthermore, reflection 
scores did not relate to connectivity scores, which indicate that this network does not 
signal positive thought patterns in our sample.  In sum, depression severity does relate 




but it may do so because of the tight coupling between rumination and depression as they 
are highly overlapping constructs. 
The measure of rumination that was used in our study was a trait measure, namely 
how much people ruminate in their daily lives. However, it seems reasonable that this 
trait level measure would predict state rumination.  First, as stated above, our correlations 
between brooding and connectivity scores during rest are greater than the correlations 
between reflection scores and connectivity during rest, thus providing some evidence that 
the thinking going on during these rest periods is probably not constructive.  Second, 
partialing out reflection scores did not affect the correlation between brooding and 
connectivity during rest, indicating that other forms of thinking seem not to be explaining 
these data.  It would have been difficult for us to ask participants what they were doing 
during these rest breaks post-hoc, because it would have been difficult for participants to 
remember the thoughts they were having after the fact.   Participants could have been 
prompted with rumination questions throughout the rest periods, but then the rest periods 
would not be as unguided.  Since our rest periods were unguided (i.e., participants were 
not induced to ruminate) and interspersed with task epochs, some ecological validity may 
have been gained, since participants in the real world are not prompted to ruminate, but 
do so spontaneously.     
As a more general point, our data suggest that studying on-task behavior may 
mitigate some differences between MDDs and HCs in that engaging in a task may disrupt 
rumination.  Our data showed that the hyper-connectivities that were found at rest 
disappeared during the task, and the relationship between trait rumination and 




component of depression, then studying it may require moving to more unguided types of 
paradigms.   This idea is consistent with Raichle‘s (2010) suggestion of studying the 
resting state in both health and disease rather than focus solely on reflexive or ―on-task‖ 
performance. 
Importantly, our results build on the results of Greicius et al., (2007)  as MDDs 
demonstrate increased default network connectivity with the subgenual cingulate that can 
be linked to rumination, but only during unguided rest-periods.  Based on these results, 
ruminative behavioral and psychological processes can be ascribed to these neural 
differences linking brain and behavior.  In sum, subgenual-cingulate hyper-connectivity 
in MDDs was restricted to periods of quiescence and may provide a neural mechanism of 
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Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
 
―Man can alter his life by altering his thinking.‖ William James 
 This dissertation has explored the role of interference in short-term memory and 
its relationship to major depressive disorder.  In Chapter 2 it was shown that interference 
is a major cause of forgetting in short-term memory as stimuli from one trial back 
seemingly overwrote memory traces from stimuli two trials back.  This retroactive 
interference (which mitigated proactive interference from the 2-back memory set) 
swamped the effect of decay with the mere passage of time.  This series of experiments 
reinforced the powerful role that interference plays in short-term memory, specifically in 
forgetting. 
 In Chapter 3 basic paradigms aimed to explore interference resolution in short-
term memory were applied to depression.  Utilizing a variant of the directed-forgetting 
task with valenced materials, it was found that people suffering from major depression 
had more difficulty resolving interference from negatively valenced material and that this 
inability was related to the propensity that one has to ruminate about negative life events.  
These results show that the inability to remove negative information from short-term 




memory) may underlie ruminative processing.  While the neural networks supporting 
interference resolution for both groups were quite similar, MDDs showed more spatial 
variance in LiFG, a region critical for interference resolution, and the amount of variance 
was related to the amount of difficulty in suppressing negative information in short-term 
memory.  What is not clear at this point is whether such increased noise levels reflect a 
noisy interference resolution system, or more task-unrelated thoughts associated with 
having negative information in mind.  Future research will be required to parse out this 
important distinction. 
 Chapter 4 presented a very different approach to studying depression.  Most 
researchers focus on reflexive and task oriented behavior to understand psychological 
processing, but as Raichle (2010) pointed out in his recent review, much of what the 
brain does may be more intrinsic and not necessarily affected by engaging in cognitive 
tasks.  This intrinsic activity has been termed the default mode network (Raichle, 2010).  
Others have found differences between MDDs and HCs in the default mode network 
(Greicius et al., 2007), however, it has not been shown how these neural differences 
relate to psychological variables.  The results presented in Chapter 4 show that more 
default network connectivity, specifically in the subgenual cingulate, is related to more 
rumination, a psychological variable.  In addition, this rumination was negative in 
valence as more positive forms of thinking, such as reflection, did not correlate with these 
off-task connectivities.  Interestingly, these differences between MDDs and HCs 
disappeared when participants were engaged in a task, just like the relationship between 
rumination and default network connectivity.  Taken together these results suggest that 




addition to on-task behavior, because one‘s task of interest may distract MDDs from the 
very activity that may underlie their depression, namely rumination. 
 The relationship between Chapter 4 and Chapters 2 and 3 becomes stronger when 
one conceptualizes rumination as an internally generated form of interference.  For 
example, if one has just been rejected in a romantic relationship, thinking about that 
relationship creates a form of interference that makes it difficult to work and concentrate.  
As was shown in Chapter 4 engaging in a task seemed to distract MDD participants and 
prevent the default network from being as engaged.  However, we know that such 
distraction only temporarily alleviates negative moods (Kross & Ayduk, 2008) and 
therefore is not a long-term solution. 
 This, however, relates to the James quote above that ―man can alter his life by 
altering his thinking.‖  What Kross & Ayduk (2008) found to be effective in alleviating 
negative moods that were induced by recalling negative life events was not to distract 
oneself, but to think about such events from a distanced or third party perspective.  Such 
an approach is not escapist in nature, but rather confronts problems, but in a way that 
removes a lot of the distortions that may accompany rumination when one attributes 
negative life events to one‘s intrinsic character.  In some sense, this is the basic approach 
of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) where psychologists help clients restructure their 
thoughts and their thought patterns, thus changing their lives by changing their thinking.  
While, James is correct in thinking that altering thinking can alter lives, it is a process 




 It has been found that interacting with nature can have profound impacts on 
cognitive functioning and self-regulation performance (Kaplan & Berman, 2010).  
Interacting with nature has been shown to increase attention and short-term memory 
capacity (Berman, Jonides & Kaplan, 2008), reduce the incidence of aggression and 
crime (Kuo & Sullivan 2001a&b), improve health outcomes for breast cancer patients 
(Cimprich & Ronis, 2003) and reduce attentional problems in children (Taylor & Kuo, 
2009).  It seems that interacting with nature has a broad and diverse impact on a wide 
range of problems.  Therefore, in future research we hope to explore how interacting with 
nature might aid people suffering from depression, under the hypothesis that interacting 
with nature may promote distanced strategies when thinking about negative life events.  
Such an intervention may provide people the resources and strategies to resolve internally 
generated forms of interference created by rumination that time alone may not heal. 
 While there may be some ways to reduce the effects of rumination and the 
interference that results from such rumination, there is another question that is worth 
exploring and that is the nature of the mechanism of interference.  Namely, what is 
causing interference?  This is an important question to answer in order to understand 
more mechanistically how interference works.  While there are many potential 
mechanisms of interference, only a few will be focused upon here.  For example, might 
interference be the result of a faulty inhibitory system, where neural activation that 
represents interfering thoughts in mind cannot be dampened down by inhibitory control.  
In this case lateral inhibition or maybe even more forms of global inhibition are not 
operating strong enough to dampen neural activity that represents interfering thoughts or 




competition.  While our brains contain a seemingly infinite number of neurons, we know 
that the number is actually around 10-100 billion.  Therefore, we have a limited number 
of neural resources to represent our current thoughts and actions.  If superfluous 
information is in mind, that information will be represented by some set of neurons, 
which may limit the number of neural resources that are available to focus on the things 
that are task relevant.  There is yet another way to frame resource competition and that is 
with respect to broader attentional mechanisms.  As Kaplan & Berman (2010) discussed 
directed attention may be a resource common to many cognitive and self-regulatory 
behaviors.  If some attentional resources are devoted to interfering information, than there 
will be less directed attention resources available to help maintain current items in the 
focus of attention.  Whether interference is the result of inefficient inhibition, resource 
limitations or both, is certainly an important area of future research, which would help in 
the design of systems and interventions aimed to mitigate the negative impacts of 
interference on current task performance.    
Lastly, all of the work presented in this dissertation, along with the work we have 
done looking at the impact of nature on cognitive functioning have implications for 
broader environmental and system design.  In showing how powerful interference is to 
causing forgetting in short-term memory, it seems important to consider how we might 
design work and school environments that would limit interference.  One problem is that 
many school and work environments are actually incorporating more interference into the 
environment rather than trying to mitigate it.  For example, many school and work 
settings have TV or video displays that may actually produce interference in memory.  In 




incorporating more information into daily practices, which may actually have 
counterproductive effects, but producing more interference rather than increasing 
knowledge.  It could be that for many of these situations, less is more.  It seems that 
providing environmental supports to help limit or mitigate interference would provide 
individuals with more cognitive resources.  In addition, while it was shown that MDDs 
ruminate more than HCs, thereby creating more internal interference, HCs ruminate as 
well.  If we could design workplace settings and schools that helped to mitigate 
rumination, we may be able to improve overall health and productivity for many 
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